Common Ownership Research: Implications for Corporate Governance

ABSTRACT Research Question/Issue Common ownership research has rapidly expanded across multiple disciplines—economics, finance, law, accounting, and others. Limited attention, however, has been paid to the implications of shareholders investing in multiple competing firms for corporate governance. The purpose of this review is to integrate the literature on common ownership with a particular focus on corporate governance inferences. Research Findings/Insights This review focuses on the implications of common ownership for corporate governance and the shareholder value maximization paradigm, and specific governance facets such as shareholder activism, managerial accountability and executive compensation, board of directors, and stakeholder governance. Theoretical/Academic Implications Common ownership scholars debate whether common ownership reduces competition in order to increase industry profitability or promotes better governance that could reduce negative externalities imposed by portfolio companies on society at large. This review identifies points of contention in analyzing and assessing the impact of common ownership, synthesizes the implications for the field of corporate governance, and provides a roadmap of questions for future empirical and theoretical research. Practitioner/Policy Implications Increasing concerns by regulatory agencies regarding the impact of common ownership—shareholders concurrently investing in rival firms—on competitive actions and incentives to compete have largely ignored the implications of common ownership for corporate governance. In the context of common ownership, how does shareholder primacy embedded in governance reforms affect the pursuit of firm‐specific competitive advantage and competition for essential stakeholders and, subsequently, the long‐term viability, resilience, and competitiveness of the firm?