An Improved Attack on the RSA Variant Based on Cubic Pell Equation

In this paper, we present a novel method to solve trivariate polynomial modular equations of the form x(y2+Ay+B)+z≡0 (mod e). Our approach integrates Coppersmith’s method with lattice basis reduction to efficiently solve the former equation. Several variants of RSA are based on the cubic Pell equation x3+fy3+f2z3−3fxyz≡1 (mod N), where f is a cubic nonresidue modulus N=pq. In these variants, the public exponent e and the private exponent d satisfy ed≡1 (mod ψ(N)) with ψ(N)=p2+p+1q2+q+1. Moreover, d can be written in the form d≡v0z0 (mod ψ(N)) with any z0 satisfying gcd(z0,ψ(N))=1. In this paper, we apply our method to attack the variants when d≡v0z0 (mod ψ(N)) and when |z0| and |v0| are suitably small. We also show that our method significantly improves the bounds of the private exponents d of the previous attacks on the variants, particularly in the scenario of small private exponents and in the scenarios where partial information about the primes is available.

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Publication Details

Journal
Cryptography
Published
2025-06-06
DOI
https://doi.org/10.3390/cryptography9020040
Citations
2
Primary Topic
Network Security and Intrusion Detection
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
2.97
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article

An Improved Attack on the RSA Variant Based on Cubic Pell Equation

Abdelhamid Tadmori, Abderrahmane Nitaj, Mohammed Rahmani, M’hammed Ziane
2 citations
Cryptography
Network Security and Intrusion Detection
2.97
article

An Improved Attack on the RSA Variant Based on Cubic Pell Equation

Abdelhamid Tadmori, Abderrahmane Nitaj, Mohammed Rahmani, M’hammed Ziane
article en
2 citations

Abstract

In this paper, we present a novel method to solve trivariate polynomial modular equations of the form x(y2+Ay+B)+z≡0 (mod e). Our approach integrates Coppersmith’s method with lattice basis reduction to efficiently solve the former equation. Several variants of RSA are based on the cubic Pell equation x3+fy3+f2z3−3fxyz≡1 (mod N), where f is a cubic nonresidue modulus N=pq. In these variants, the public exponent e and the private exponent d satisfy ed≡1 (mod ψ(N)) with ψ(N)=p2+p+1q2+q+1. Moreover, d can be written in the form d≡v0z0 (mod ψ(N)) with any z0 satisfying gcd(z0,ψ(N))=1. In this paper, we apply our method to attack the variants when d≡v0z0 (mod ψ(N)) and when |z0| and |v0| are suitably small. We also show that our method significantly improves the bounds of the private exponents d of the previous attacks on the variants, particularly in the scenario of small private exponents and in the scenarios where partial information about the primes is available.

CryptographyVol. 9(2)
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (FR), Abdelmalek Essaâdi University (MA), Normandie Université (FR), Mohamed I University (MA), Université de Caen Normandie (FR)
Openalex Percentile: Top 8%
Network Security and Intrusion Detection
2.97
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