Combinatorial double auction for multi-resource trading in IoT applications
The proliferation of Internet of Things (IoT) devices has opened new roads for collaborative distributed applications, particularly in smart city environments, where a variety of resources, including sensing, actuation, computation, and storage, are essential for providing effective location-based services. This paper specifically focuses on the sharing of heterogeneous resources among IoT applications in smart cities. By leveraging game-theoretic principles, this study addresses resource allocation through a combinatorial double auction. The solution is rooted in the concept of Social IoT (SIoT), where Internet-connected objects create dynamic social networks based on rules set by their owners. Social relationships, such as ownership and co-location, are leveraged to form groups offering enhanced reliability resource bundles. The proposed solution offers several key economic properties, including incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and a balanced budget, while maintaining low computational complexity. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed combinatorial double auction mechanism achieves over $$70\%$$ successful resource allocation for up to 1000 requests, maintains computational efficiency with execution times under 30 s, and ensures economic properties such as incentive compatibility and individual rationality, making it a scalable and practical solution for large-scale smart city IoT applications.
Authors
- Sara Ranjbaran
- Sérgio D. Correia (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1111-3513)
- Amir Reza Jafari (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0009-6297-1885)
- Noël Crespi (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2962-192X)
Institutions
- Uninova (PT)
- Institut Polytechnique de Paris (FR)
- Universidade Politécnica de Portalegre (PT)
- Services répartis, Architectures, MOdélisation, Validation, Administration des Réseaux (FR)
- Aalto University (FI)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Discover Internet of Things
- Published
- 2025-06-06
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s43926-025-00166-w
- Citations
- 1
- Primary Topic
- Auction Theory and Applications
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 2.11