MFM-SAT: A Dynamic Authenticated Encryption Suite for Satellite Communication Security
Recently, the rapid advancement of satellite communication (SATCOM) systems, driven by space launch technologies, has led to security vulnerabilities. The Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems (CCSDS) recommends the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) to ensure SATCOM links security. Since its 2001 release, the AES algorithm has been vulnerable to cryptanalytic attacks, particularly its key schedule. The growing information technology (IT) community, quantum computing (QC), and geostationary (GEO) SATCOM of 15 to 20 years pose significant threats to SATCOM link security. Using a fixed AES algorithm structure with the same security credentials (SCs) throughout the SATCOM lifespan may weaken security and cause control loss. To solve the problem, a dynamic encryption suite (MFM-SAT) with proven security is suggested, which has a higher level of security than the AES algorithm, to protect the SATCOM links. It provides 512-bit security and utilizes 256-bit permutation internally. Its key schedule design, with a 64-byte key length, annihilates the attack of Grover's quantum computing algorithm. Its dynamicity offers about 2<sup xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">17</sup> secure work issues for each SATCOM packet encryption and more than 2<sup xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">256</sup> for each secret key update. These work issues shift the attacker's focus from getting the secret key to locating the work issue that is actually being used and covering SATCOM security throughout its lengthy life cycle.
Authors
- Hanady H. Issa (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1821-9628)
- Ahmed Abdelhafez (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1146-9149)
- Khaled Shehata
- Ahmed Mahmoud Rayan
Institutions
- National Telecommunication Regulatory Authority (EG)
- Arab Academy for Science, Technology, and Maritime Transport (EG)
Publication Details
- Published
- 2025-05-06
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1109/nrsc65659.2025.11018548
- Primary Topic
- Cryptographic Implementations and Security
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00