From Crisis to Technocracy

This paper examines the relationship between economic crises, institutional factors, and technocratic appointments in European governments during the 2006-2015 period, with a specific focus on the European sovereign debt crisis (2010-2015). Using data from twelve Eurozone member states, the study demonstrates that countries most severely affected by the crisis—Greece, Italy, and Portugal—were the only ones to resort to technocratic appointments between 2011 and 2015. The analysis operationalises technocratic appointments as fully technocratic governments, technocrat-led governments, or technocratic ministers of finance. Through regression analysis, the study reveals that both general government gross debt and legislative fractionalisation serve as predictors for technocratic appointments, with gross debt showing a stronger impact. The findings confirm existing literature suggesting governments tend to appoint non-partisan, expert ministers during severe economic crises, potentially as a strategy to dilute political responsibility while maintaining governmental effectiveness. This research contributes to understanding how economic pressures reshape political institutions and decision-making during crisis periods.