Majority illusion drives the spontaneous emergence of alternative states in common-pool resource games with network-based information

Common-pool resources (CPRs), including fisheries and the atmosphere, are critical for ecological, social, and economic sustainability but are easily overused. We use an agent-based model to investigate how social networks shape resource extraction outcomes. Networks with highly visible nodes can create a "majority illusion" in which most users believe high-intensity extraction is dominant, even if it is not. This misperception can push the entire population toward one of two possible states: an abundant, high-welfare resource or a depleted, low-welfare one. Aligning users' environmental impact with their visibility can mitigate this effect and steer the system toward a single, predictable outcome. These results suggest that network-based policies, such as reshaping information flows, particularly targeting high-impact hubs, could help stabilize cooperative behaviors and encourage sustainable management of CPRs, reducing the risk of tragedy-of-the-commons scenarios.