Closing information gaps in DMA enforcement—expectations, incentives, and the role of anonymity for whistleblowers

Abstract The introduction of the Digital Markets Act (DMA) Whistleblower Tool marks an important step in encouraging informants to report DMA breaches by gatekeepers, while navigating the complexities of anonymity and protection for informants. This article aims to answer the question of how the implementation of the DMA Whistleblower Tool impacts potential whistleblowers and their incentives to come forward. To this extent, we examine varying levels of anonymity (full, partial, non-anonymous) and their respective advantages and disadvantages for whistleblowers, highlighting the necessity for regulators to secure protections against retaliation without compromising administrative efficiency or due process. Despite the DMA’s intention to apply the protections of the Whistleblower Directive (WBD), practical implementation has lagged, creating several challenges. The DMA’s reliance on the WBD faces obstacles due to the decentralized nature of the WBD, the DMA’s centralized reporting system, the differing focus of internal versus external reporting channels, and the mismatch between the WBD’s focus on insiders and the DMA’s broader range of potential informants, such as business users and competitors. These issues point to the need for enhanced procedural clarity, better utilization of national competition authorities, improved alignment between the DMA and the WBD, and the formation of DMA interest groups to advocate for business users.