Democracy With Out Truth? Re-Reading <i>Democracy and Tradition</i> for the Post-Truth Era

This year marks the twentieth anniversary of Democracy and Tradition, Jeffrey Stout's landmark work of pragmatist political philosophy. In the twenty years since the book's publication, much has happened that will have reverberating impacts on American democracy for decades to come. Given recent developments, it is worth reevaluating Democracy and Tradition to assess the extent to which it can, or cannot, offer guidance for our current moment. More specifically, I want to consider how Stout's work might help us respond to present concerns that we now live in a post-truth society, in which opinion matters more than fact and misinformation is rampant.My interest in focusing on this particular topic is two-fold. First, Stout's defense of democratic norms is decidedly pluralistic, meaning he tries to make room for a variety of truth claims to coexist while illuminating the practices needed to navigate them. When considering the relationship of truth and democracy, pluralism is a necessary consideration as well. Second, as a work of pragmatist philosophy, Democracy and Tradition is susceptible to the accusation that it actually supports a post-truth ethos, and therefore it risks undergirding current threats to our democracy. Though I conclude that Stout is innocent of this charge, it is important to fully examine whether his pragmatist accounting of democratic pluralism carries such a risk.I contend that Stout's account of democratic practices remains a valuable resource for understanding civic virtue in American democracy. Nevertheless, I will suggest that, in light of the post-truth moment, his account of truth and justification could be strengthened by an examination of ignorance, especially as it is produced and manufactured among citizens. Such an account of ignorance can provide a starting point to for a more expansive account of the democratic practices necessary to cultivate civic virtue in our post-truth moment.Though the term post-truth had been in existence for over a decade, it surged in popularity during Donald Trump's presidential campaign and later, his presidency. The post-truth era did not begin or end with Trump, but the number of books and articles that were devoted to the topic during his tenure convey that his presidency was exemplary of the broader phenomenon. Less than a month after Trumps's 2016 electoral victory, Oxford dictionary named post-truth as its word of the year, defining it as an adjective meaning “relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief.”1In the wake of these developments, pragmatism has at times been accused of being a post-truth philosophy that lends support to the worst impulses of our post-truth age. For example, Mark Edmundson penned a 2023 essay in Harpers, “Truth Takes a Vacation: Trumpism and the American Philosophical Tradition,” in which he describes pragmatism as a manifestation of the American tendencies that gave rise to Trump. Edmundson focuses heavily on Richard Rorty, but he is clear that the problem resides within the pragmatist tradition more broadly. Edmundson clearly has great respect for Rorty as both a thinker and as human being, but he does not mince words: “none of that changes the fact that Rorty dedicated his life to advancing a view of truth—philosophical pragmatism—that helped lead Donald Trump to the White House.”2In order to examine the relevance of Democracy and Tradition for our current moment, I must evaluate whether these accusations are valid for pragmatism in general, and for Stout in particular. My contention is that pragmatist philosophy is not post-truth in the pejorative sense. By the pejorative sense, I mean in the sense of supporting the manipulation of facts and promotion of disinformation in the pursuit of power. This pejorative sense accords with Lee McIntyre's description of post-truth in his book of the same name. Beginning with Oxford's definition quoted above, McIntyre concedes that it adequately describes what post-truth circumstances look like, but he notes that Oxford fails to describe why such circumstances come about. McIntyre suggests that the “post-truth relationship to fact only occurs when we are seeking to assert something that is more important to us than the truth itself. Thus post-truth amounts to a form of ideological supremacy whereby its practitioners are trying to compel someone to believe in something whether there is good evidence for it or not. And this is a recipe for political domination.”3 In other words, post-truth is about power; it is about manipulating and dominating others, something the pragmatist tradition has consistently opposed.Of course, before I paint pragmatism with too broad a brush, I should acknowledge that it is an umbrella category describing an immensely diverse array of ideas and thinkers. What holds pragmatists together is their attention to the relationship between belief and action and a commitment to evaluating ideas by considering their practical effects in the world. There is no single agreed-upon pragmatist conception of truth. However, pragmatists tend to share a deep awareness of the limits of our access to truth. This awareness—coupled with a recognition that the things we believe to be true shape the way we live and act in the world—sometimes leads pragmatist thinkers to describe truth in ways that can feel dangerous in our post-truth moment. When William James writes “truth is what works” or when Richard Rorty claims “truth is what our peers will let us get away with” it must set off the alarm bells of anyone who is concerned about the status of truth in society. After all, when Kellyanne Conway famously asserted that the disagreement over the crowd size at Trump's presidential inauguration was simply a matter of “alternative facts,”4 she was adjusting the truth about the crowd to fit what worked for the Trump administration and she was certainly testing what the American public would let her get away with.Though I acknowledge the possible dangers of such formulations of truth, our understanding of pragmatist thought would remain quite shallow if only based on the pithy and provocative phrases mentioned above. Pragmatist ways of speaking about truth are born out of a dissatisfaction with correspondence theories of truth because pragmatists doubt that humans can step outside of the world and look upon it as a spectator. Defining truth as what works, for example, is a way of saying that our beliefs about the world are often based on what helps us make sense of the world as we experience it. This does not mean we are justified in claiming anything at all to be true without evidence or good faith inquiry. Pragmatists have still generally been concerned with what it means to be warranted in asserting or believing a particular claim. At times, some pragmatists like Dewey will even define truth in terms of warranted assertability. However, neopragmatists like Rorty and Stout preserve a stronger distinction between truth and justification, finding it more fruitful to focus their analysis on the latter. They follow Donald Davidson in their conclusion that there is little explanatory value in trying to define truth.5 Truth is a semantic rather than epistemic concept. Rorty's statement that truth is what our peers will let us get away with is therefore an ironic summation of how truth functions linguistically, rather than a serious definition of the term. Ultimately, for both Rorty and Stout, our time is better spent considering what constitutes a justified belief.One could thus easily call oneself a pragmatist and still be alarmed at Conway's assertion because it is insufficiently justified. People's concerns about the post-truth era stem in large part from the dangers it presents for American democracy, creating an environment ripe for authoritarianism. This leads some to draw the conclusion that democracy requires a strong commitment to truth. However, it is worth noting that for many pragmatist philosophers, their conceptions of truth are very much intertwined with their commitment to democracy.As an example of this tendency, let us consider the great pragmatist theorist of democracy, John Dewey. Dewey clarifies the mutually reinforcing nature of his philosophical and political commitments in is his essay “Philosophy and Democracy.” Here he defines philosophy, not in terms of the pursuit of knowledge, but the pursuit of wisdom. By this he means that philosophy is concerned with more than the mere apprehension of fact or truth. Wisdom is a term and as such it is concerned not only with but with what we to with it. Wisdom what of and For Dewey action of is an with the to what it will what it will and what it will Democracy as a way of is such an with the world and Dewey out to what might be from it. In order to he the of and as a definition of democracy. The for there is and a world which is in some sense and in the the that there is a and it among that in that by with the life of more by the democratic is very much in with a pragmatist view of the world. For pragmatism is a philosophy of democracy. When we the limits of our access to truth, the of human and the to and to it is to democracy as a form of what is to that could not the that truth is what is and it that their Rorty has an to but it is not very In and he that there is no a could not have with much Dewey about truth, even while with about the value of democracy. writes is I that many for a between philosophy and than there is or can In on the for a philosophical view which be by the political which will only to good there will be such a philosophical view is a which can be by many Rorty is thus that pragmatism is not democratic in a way that can off Ultimately, philosophy or or of truth, is only as good as what with his Edmundson writes that Rorty a of the who would what he about to not is as as Richard Here Edmundson a conclusion as the between Rorty and Trump is They at commitments from a starting For this is for but I about it a I would that Trump and Rorty's I want to their beliefs about truth not a starting point but a end They from but in ways their and view of the world lead to a about truth. However, the still make all the because their about truth to based on their I Rorty is more or less that fully pragmatism of post-truth Though I based on its of support for democratic that pragmatism is not post-truth in the pejorative sense, I not will be fully to draw the same our access to can democracy by to facts for their the other it can provide a for democracy by to remain to other of how can we on the democratic and the This is I believe Stout can help and Tradition is not a book about truth. as the a book about the American democratic an account of how a democratic to to truth, is to his account of democratic norms and is to of thinkers in this First, he is like Rorty and John who too often in their to out the terms of democratic The Stout and its John and Though diverse in their what these thinkers have in is their of as for of to as us to of as from tradition and of In public this leads to of us is to our but this means we can no to to important from our and are to make to The their from their to this we to within a tradition with a conception of the good can we of some the of the are very much in with who are concerned about our post-truth society. about our to about important on Stout is concerned about this as but he will not that we can only to who share our conception of what is true about the world. Stout that American democracy is a a tradition that room for and truth we can only the that tradition has to we will practices that us to navigate and political without democratic an account of democracy as a Stout does not mean to it with which was the focus of the of as by Stout that the terms and democracy are in their from the However, as a point of disagreement with he is that as a and is too in its thought and to be with such a broad democracy, of as a tradition Stout to an accounting of the of in terms of the of the Stout describes democracy by its the of Stout what the and practices of democracy make on the way we to Stout to describe the of democracy as and In Stout's democracy constitutes a of of it does not to it not it to or but it to who his or her as an and in the of the The democratic in the of to as This is not to some of of the which is its form of and to which democratic is Stout only form of democratic is in which is as an that must by as an In other words, is not as an in and of but rather the of the is that must be in relationship to practices that Stout often with the democratic tradition are of and for and of from her commitments and of the commitments from which This constitutes a of which we to among our Stout of the democratic is to as many as possible the of for and to or power. the is not the from that a can only be by and of in particular Stout pluralism as both an of our democratic and as something that must be over time as we navigate and evidence of our commitment to Stout and on the part of to things with us to of truth and In Democracy and Tradition, Stout focuses on the claims that are in public to on to an understanding of truth as and he is not to truth to what is justified in believing or what is warranted in Stout his which form of pragmatism that and to truth to some form of or Given his commitment to a understanding of truth, might why Stout Rorty and as is to define truth. Stout is less in definition and more in how true functions in democratic has a and therefore an important in the status true to our beliefs and and to to but it is not to us whether our beliefs actually this we a clear definition of truth in order to in democratic Stout a definition of truth is needed to the democratic of and its of I no evidence that this is I that to a to democratic to on that when the to are better to their commitment to democracy from the of the other words, Stout is that the of a democracy on our to the of have a practical of what is means to something is true simply because it is a term of assertion that truth is is about can be justified in believing something even if we that it is By a clear distinction between truth and justification, Stout can that justification is even truth is not. is to what is justified in believing is based on the evidence as as the particular and practices of When political and we should be that come to the with of and to a topic of of of other commitments will a recognition of what or tradition come how their have been by their the of requires us to our beliefs to In the we to our or beliefs as we are to and justified in believing from to our beliefs to The of the to light us to the that I Stout could help us how can we on the democratic and the Stout's in democratic of what is true will be a of a democracy. What matters is how we democracy requires that we remain to by to Stout's practices help us Democracy and Tradition it that the relationship Stout describes between justification, and has it was fully After all, have and at some have been to Stout was certainly of this when he penned Democracy and at the of on he us to be of who as or as if there was no better Stout us to be in such to account by consistently to their and to their as much as possible with the of our democratic and he often to public by public we our to account for their and this is way to to political is what to all the recent about some I we simply were not to the of and that would his Trump and his often from the of above. we now the there is a very that Trump could the campaign Trump has his has he would and political has from great and that are the of the of this should be for an American but the has to and he an of support among citizens. Though it remains to be whether Trump will support to the it is still to feel as if many have in who to be who to be to the Stout must be course, the post-truth problem is than single a in Stout that pluralism is an of our noting we can this by at the practices we much to value things with we to be quite a of our political and The Oxford definition of post-truth suggests that the we of opinion is because appeals to emotion and personal belief public opinion more than objective Though pragmatism to be of the very of we can still the of the Oxford definition by the of objective facts with something like facts we are justified in believing to be The is that it like, more than we are to not on the that Stout but on facts and to Stout's account of truth and justification in democratic we can now if it holds value for the post-truth moment. I that it remains a account of how truth and justification in public assertion that justification is remains for that we can only work with the and experience we are to that other be with on and starting from commitments only Stout's for democratic practices as a means of these However, the post-truth concerns about what constitutes justified Given the of misinformation and disinformation we now we should some we be for to or could we be justified in believing it if we this not because I have a clear but because I want to point out something that Democracy and Tradition does not adequately I suggest that in to the of truth and justification in the life of a democracy, Stout should have the of the post-truth problem is less by the of truth than by the of And we of ignorance as a of knowledge, I would in with a of that ignorance is in fact more has a of ignorance The is as a This is the ignorance we are born the that the of The is as a This describes ignorance as a is a of human have attention and on we are based on what important or or This of ignorance helps important of our current the fact that we are to much all the and our beliefs much more in the of the and is that much of it will by However, there are times when is or and this leads to of as a or an This is the of the post-truth problem because it describes ignorance as it is and by this way of ignorance in his of how about the effects of can a more recent example in to by creating a a term that he to in a way to The when a set of from a that was the and have phrases from the and the by the At Trump an order in the After the order in some their to from did not matter that an was a part of public to begin political worked to it and it as and a these were to the of it to to about of or have had The an of the is on all that have been opinion and the and to current such have been since of a of had been or on the number of in 2023 and is not The of these by and how and other can be who the and it from justified in their belief that is and is for to the and who in but I cannot, with the same about the who them. I as an example because I help how ignorance can be manufactured to the example the of whether someone is justified in their I could have on all the misinformation but I it be to with in the and of a to about and the other of us with of about in the the who for of simply being Thus what the of these to is the of what White ignorance is a among in which are to the of and not because the truth is from but because are not to it. This description might make it as if who is of such ignorance has an to the of but their as more that with of supremacy and of the who the have been by ignorance, whether it or not. Stout that justification is because we can only work with the that is to us at However, in the of ignorance, that the is but to it. of beliefs a the we off the for on the other there are for in a to their like this why I a of ignorance would make a fruitful to Stout's account in Democracy and of Democracy and Tradition, I want to end on a more by that Stout does offer a valuable account of ignorance in the it is simply to ignorance as a is to his account of justification is born out of his awareness that we are in our is a call for epistemic and it can provide a starting point to his account of civic virtue in Democracy in Tradition in to the post-truth Stout's of that some of the we are justified in believing might not be true is to that no matter how we now and about it remains as we can to for truth as of our is to that in are born with ignorance, and even as we and our that is as we for truth, especially truth, we must with a and a to our beliefs as of our limits can thus be a to civic virtue because it requires us to a to other notes that ignorance is often as a ignorance be as a This is of in Democracy and that we not view in terms of but in terms of by The of knowledge, and that to and In Dewey and must as little a 2023 at the for Dewey contention that ignorance is often by and a of of what she as a of to post-truth in the Here ignorance is as way of an to and evaluate more that we could consider practices of as an to what Stout the practices of democracy. Stout's focus on democratic practices to the illuminating of his democracy will by of over beliefs and practices that help us this is to a democracy. The post-truth now that we practices that us to ignorance when it is manufactured to What would such practices look and is certainly a good but that is in the practices Stout Stout's practices of and for and of I would that practices of ignorance might an of the is in might not for but why to their a to more before a of we to to Such practices of can a way the of to and I have as a in what I call the of practices of ignorance us the of to about how we evaluate and on our For ignorance in to our experience us in relationship of and which a of inquiry. 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