A Peircean Rejoinder in Defense of Metaphysics Amid Communities of Inquiry

All the contributions in the issue are about pragmatists by pragmatists, and yet a vast swath of pragmatic thinking is conspicuously absent. Not all pragmatists take the linguistic turn and reduce philosophy to analyzing the grammar and language games of communal practices. In my own work, I prefer to label such pragmatists neopragmatists in order to distinguish them from classical pragmatists.3 For the latter group, taking their cues from the origins of American pragmatism in Charles Peirce, metaphysics and truth claims are very much on the table. Metaphysics just needs to be nonfoundational, and the fallibility of all truth claims needs to be embraced. I work out of the resources of classical pragmatism, not neopragmatism, meaning I am optimistic about avoiding negative social consequences of living in a post-truth era, because I reject the accuracy of Mary Leah Friedline's label of “post-truth” for describing our situation. I also like the idea of embracing democracy and world religions in dialogue as different kinds of traditions in theory, but find myself pessimistic about the proposals of Louis A. Ruprecht Jr. and Tracey Mark Stout when searching for specific examples. As some examples I found will demonstrate, not all communities are created equally. Some embrace fallibilism and pluralism better than others, which makes figuring out which sorts of communities we want to work with a matter of utmost importance. Some block the way of inquiry, which seems to necessarily entail their exclusion from nonfoundational, fallible, and pluralistic projects in democracy as well as within theology. Such an understanding of what sorts of theological projects are worth putting in dialogue and what sorts are found wanting is missing from Joe Pettit's criticism of my work, and highlighting this methodological feature of my philosophical theological method will show why I cannot accept his alternative proposal about divine transcendence and immanence.Friedline wants to embrace the pluralism entailed by neopragmatism and postmodernity without accepting the subsequent conclusion that literally anything goes. Richard Rorty thought that pragmatism entails this conclusion, which Friedline rightly views as an unfortunate pitfall, when he described pragmatism as “the doctrine that there are no constraints on inquiry save conversational ones.”4 Thus, we might be an open democracy at our best and Nazis at our worst, and there may be little to no rational difference between the two positions. If that claim is true, the strategies of misinforming and disinforming through deliberate lies that worry Friedline could very easily follow. My suggestion is that the tools of neopragmatism are not the only ones, or even the best ones, with which to avoid such post-truth problems. Peirce maintains the best features of neopragmatism while nonetheless engaging in metaphysics.Peirce would happily embrace pluralistic democratic communities, as pluralism was also his ideal model for scientific inquiry. He absolutely rejected foundational thinking about anything, especially authoritarian means of establishing foundations. He was a thorough fallibilist, which means nobody can be certain if something held to be true now will hold up in the long run.5 In order to separate the wheat from the chaff, so to speak, a pluralistic group inquiring about a subject together is required. Of course, many claims now regarded as ridiculous were once thought to be true. This fact will not surprise any fallibilist. However, I think such cognitive errors should be welcomed by pragmatists as opportunities for progress. Cognitive errors and failed ideas close off one route of inquiry so that attention can be placed elsewhere. Therefore, fallibilism entails that diversity and a group full of disagreement on any subject is crucial for getting closer to the truth about that subject, as a simple example will illustrate.While great progress has been made in quantum mechanics, it is still not fully understood. However, the fact that it has overturned some older mistaken ideas about particles and the seemingly physical nature of reality is well understood. Albert Einstein infamously dismissed some early quantum experiments. He was particularly unconvinced by quantum entanglement—action at a distance—since it went against the seeming need for two particles to interact in close proximity in order to impact one another. Yet entanglement has been confirmed as a phenomenon over and over again. The relevance of my point about pragmatic pluralism is that progress on understanding entanglement would not have happened, or certainly would have happened more slowly, if Einstein was the only scientific voice in the room, so to speak. I think this is why Peirce often spoke of communities of inquiry.6 Diverse perspectives that disagree is perhaps the best source of novelty when a new hypothesis is needed, because we can all be stubborn like Eistein sometimes rather than considering new ideas. Thus, failure amid diversity is how progress in any inquiry is made because it is how novel perspectives that might make progress are introduced. This point about fallibilism requiring pluralistic communities directly addresses concerns that Friedline raises about the status of truth in a pluralistic situation.Peirce's thoughts on communal inquiry which I just sketched merge a correspondence theory of truth with a coherence theory of inquiry. All we have at any moment in terms of truth claims is the current coherence among ideas accepted by any given group of inquirers. However, Peirce does not leave us with a mere consensus theory of truth in which truth consists merely in what any group happens to agree about, no matter how beautiful or heinous. Fallibilists, working in pluralistic groups, should seek feedback from any and all sources and then discard anything disproven as no longer a candidate for group approval. Truth functions as a regulative ideal such groups are trying to reach, an ideal for the future. Peirce therefore unites a correspondence theory of truth with evolving communities of inquiry.7 The final truth of anything may not be something we know now, but we also cannot be dogmatic about what we currently believe. However, and crucially, groups performing inquiry in the manner I am describing must be committed to roughly similar goals.Regarding intentional ignorance and public figures who are intentionally misleading others in our democratic situation, such people self-isolate from democratic practices, if those democratic practices are understood as a form of communal inquiry as I have just described. People who participate in deliberately misleading others in service of selfish goals are not committed to democratic goals of informing the public and increasing public knowledge. While they certainly count as having diverse perspectives in a pluralistic society, they have not committed themselves to the group and its goals. I do not think this means anything as drastic as banning a political party, which might be an idea that comes to mind while reading these remarks, but suitability of office for elected figures that effectively put an end to inquiry through their lies should be a serious conversation for the sake of continuing democracy in the United States.A metaphysical scheme in which a correspondence theory of truth is tied to communal practice is not the same as truth being merely what is useful in social practice. Any community committed to Peirce's version of truth will reject foundationalism and embrace fallibilism, while also rejecting ideas that do not pass muster along the way. Embracing real feedback that results in abandoning beliefs should lead to genuine abandonment. Not all ideas, beliefs, and concepts are tools free for use. Such a community is certainly engaged in its own tradition of sorts, and must engage in discussion with communities that disagree since such exchanges are how progress is made, but it need not, and should not, tolerate everything. In our current situation we are not facing the tyranny of the majority just because white supremacists, for example, are not acting in good faith as community if they think certain people are intellectually inferior based on debunked “science” like phrenology. Not only does this metaphysical version of pragmatism avoid the post-truth pitfalls that worry Friedline, the willingness of a Peircean pragmatist to embrace novel ideas as well as discard old ones is a much stronger defense against post-truth manipulation than Jeffrey Stout's focus on publicly giving and exchanging reasons for beliefs. Peirce makes it possible to affirm the context-dependent nature of knowledge while also maintaining the common-sense notion that truth does not mean what social practice allows at any time. Justification remains relative to place and time, but not all beliefs remain on the table for all time. My Peircean alternative view of communal inquiry, of which democracy is just one example, more directly cuts off deliberate attempts to misinform because not all attempts at justification need to be accepted. COVID-19 and voter fraud are issues with limited data sets about which some perspectives can be decisively eliminated. In short, even amid disagreement, people in the sort of “great catholic” community Peirce imagined disagree in good faith rather than acting like their lies are not lies. Such good faith enables progress rather than being mired in endless partisan debates.Unfortunately, I think the ideas presented by Friedline, Ruprecht, and Stout might be too late because the way I interpret Peircean communities comes in part from Karl Popper and his paradox of tolerance. I worry that merely having better more diverse public conversations is too little too late when more decisive actions might be needed. In an eerily prescient manner, Plato described how the rise of tyrants creates problems for free democracies.8 Free people can abdicate that of a to for Popper his own paradox of to paradox of democracy as a means of avoiding the problems it the way to and embrace pluralism is not by more of people from If a is that no should be that has themselves in a way that is of being part of the pluralistic communities of inquiry Peirce The new paradox Popper is that it is not for people to such people from for the people have of to similar goals and figuring out the sorts of groups with which to work is what when I the with which Ruprecht and Stout embrace the in Jeffrey Stout's and seems to claim democracy is worth could be with such an the democracy of the United has been a for good and the Ruprecht figures on in his which I as a that we in an not a The United has not its limited resources to engage in to and at This has elected in for its own is of for and to the through its of and I also do not democracy and traditions in dialogue on terms when I for examples. democracy tradition seems worth up as worth public discussion without Stout with Jeffrey Stout when analyzing the of a democracy to two engaged in open practices of and giving Tracey Stout the work of Charles to just how limited and how much are in our pluralistic situation. As I have Peirce would agree with all of as do this comes in I also foundational traditions attempts to out such pluralistic to dialogue when I for examples. I the examples as that the between democracy and tradition needs the sort of attempts to in order to by Peirce and of was of its were to find on at the The of and of any especially in this specific The were in the because the situation in in when it the in the United to a The very people the with open are now working to from and those who welcomed are now as the elected and are seemingly the that them to have their current rather than it in In terms of and the public the public welcomed a and then that and the of what is in the public The means of embracing democracy and a tradition the of embracing a democracy and a which is why Peirce and Popper should be and should be placed on communities of an to the of the to political that free democratic The banning However, a by the that effectively this practice and was by the subsequent and rise of the for the in Jeffrey Stout's which is and which I am trying to The situation in only seems to be getting In the the made in all groups, of the to just in This was the in could in the the might even can be The like it would a in not, and also a but a a for the since the Nazis in The in and is currently the in For these the of when a in and how that with an that was by are in who to embrace the community and to on in that when those them and their is not a but a that those who for and those who and to those with open some created for the sake of the very pluralistic of and democracy that Ruprecht and Stout for is at of I think about the example of I think of tradition and democracy at once not different sorts of traditions engaged in a open I do not Charles of in such of agree with Stout and that getting over of a is a If pluralism is a means to the end of then should not leave the public religions are for the Stout might agree with on the need for some sort of since he that to being through that such Therefore, must those very pluralistic they are part of since they would not without those While this like a it can also more like a its own when people by such a turn on that same and the that it them to in turn for I am not would in such of such reading of on to what my to such can like in but of a limited and have origins as and by Any a new a status that is anything close to new will that the and the once social but now he in and to for in who is and creates that and which he to If and Ruprecht are that the for and found in and is the model for our political that seems to like a from to democratic has been an since at the and is still not a what in I have found in my on games have not about are of that have directly overturned the of at a that some of the games which are still of exclusion among their I do not if it is the tradition of or can for However, not all communities, traditions of public are created or of I do not think it is that democratic communities of inquiry will take on a Peircean that is to those acting in faith at a I Ruprecht, and by place their at the community If is a in an to the and lies by Ruprecht his with the that there was only a group of people that his and their communities long the of on the nature of communal inquiry in order to out which communities are worth engaging to Joe Pettit's with my own the ideal that is worth and conversations and the of dialogue in philosophical is what I to do in the as that and pragmatism are two not found I to together two of often to one by and by However, I am in these of and and in not just because they have thoughts about transcendence and thoughts are especially because they out of similar communities of theological inquiry which have alternative concepts of as of but for which and still late has think about this methodological with in the to his being in with that and in to the to that and so many philosophical and will to as if there are no to be just do not with and will any of to when they are Thus, very deliberately about rather than as resources for own rather than as to be might be in with one but one might also in that are for and that might be ridiculous from the of to a can be very This was certainly the in my Einstein example at the of this when he was how to in understanding quantum For there is in rather than and rejecting and the way he his ideal pluralistic situation for philosophy is a for philosophical theology. on my of the others, while on The I is by my but I do not that all the different so by knowledge of the others will is in and more or that are in dialogue with their more or rather than one as a of all However, what are to be will be up being a great of truth in there is disagreement between and on some the of the one and the many has been the focus of is there something rather than is that the something all there may be between the of that is the of that something is model of is one that is a being with and theological method is to in the he and a of metaphysical and the world in the of is with and like and but is and have different of However, there is also is no being with in of in is regarded by as a failed theological hypothesis not worth and are about their metaphysical and deliberately such claims by putting them in dialogue with especially the are and out of communities of inquiry that are diverse in the way Peirce All of this is why I to show there is and truth amid the between and why I to hold them in a rather than a their and on the nature of and have with Yet because they are and have by and of from and all such which and understanding of philosophical will more in dialogue with such at their than if they are only as of great in their those also great on what theological ideas are and therefore which ones should still be and and and in is to from the theological and how much has been rejected and how much methodological that remain about the nature of as a means of theological progress amid such as with in there is in as one route of inquiry will be attention and to be elsewhere. real philosophical as inquiry has to a consensus about the of classical the work of people such as and is a genuine of progress. I think this sort of pluralism that through on what are amid that nonetheless remain is crucial for the of philosophical theology. also just as is the in that not all are worth especially because the same terms out of different theological do not necessarily mean the same this long about method getting to specific and by because not just any about transcendence or is not to find a more than what is found in and but many will not be of since have good reasons to reject it is not getting on the of possible within any model of that is the but can be in the world when is not a being or out of a my to can be understood as more and can be with real transcendence and is a that within the of a method I in their work and as the method for which certain what I have just about theological method in my work, it is to that and are philosophical understanding of transcendence and by is a for as well as for my own seems to on an or understanding of that is not only but which it out of with agree with that is meaning is not a or of the made out of and are so because pragmatists and agree that concepts of and of are not only to in scientific but they are also in metaphysical of on a as does Peirce, while on all agree is about and in that of novelty rather than the of the philosophical are while through and moment of of that something new to what is together in way the from moment to than being by their own of novelty to This understanding of means that I do not need to to as and are in but what those will be is a and us something out of which to a novel in the which will in turn once that novel is a fact in the This scheme is not in need of that are only but and find in the is but not necessarily being of attention as an scientific In Peirce's that is by his of and that as to and may with which means are yet novelty in the of the and just are our contributions to my means of of the between and the world within in which is and all as the current status of within does not resources in the final or being within the in some the same for and our to do not make with the divine in a way that would but that was my I and for what I take to be two attempts to theological ideas about as as possible in of but I with and in the theological if not For example, have an reality in but the of the found in and my own The of being cannot be or then it would need rather than an is not because he in that makes the more with his language of and If that the world will are in then that is in the or in what needs to be may be good but it is not embracing the fact that is and all of the world need not be in their is one why I am in the possible of theological that agree theological in of must be embraced. While the is about transcendence and the which the from is about the sorts of communities of inquiry. of such as Pettit's might make my as his proposal does to a more and than the one I but such is just a given feature of the new from my I think method is of utmost in analyzing because failure to do so can to of one I will close by one criticism from that was very in getting to some of my ideas. that I do not make a between good and that I affirm is in any would to its given this missing between good and he I have any for the in the world or in any when I turn to and the social issues which communities I to have some sort of yet any for or the of the world is in any at all since I do not good from Pettit's is is just good theology. The and is separate from However, reading of his is that it why I to more optimistic language like when and I about that is my for that we do not need has and in nature those and even are in one metaphysical there is a good for the seeming in my of As as we of reality is and If the divine which I that is why it if we are If is in then we should also be and embrace those who many will are is to that I reject any of they be philosophical or I to affirm something like a more as an fact of at is a metaphysical not just an Any to and the world may or even make in the long but the conclusion I from the metaphysics is that we must has put American pragmatism and an alternative that the and in which so many are In this I have that Peirce's classical metaphysical pragmatism one way to avoid linguistic that are many the same time, it does not abandoning that are among Peirce's communities of inquiry are against especially and embrace fallibilism through and The only is one for the sake of such communities rejecting against pluralism that to such it is not just of neopragmatism and philosophy in metaphysics that can and in dialogue with Peirce's pragmatism can do All these features to theological communities of inquiry as As with one of the methodological for is to out what the goals of inquiry, and which are not worth than and that so out of with the current understanding of the world that they might as well be about an I think the of philosophical on more people the sort of communities of inquiry I have