“As Little as Possible, as Much as Necessary”

Abstract Why does the predominant actor in an international organization like the European Union ( eu ) regularly make important fiscal concessions? Why do these concessions come rather late, halfheartedly, and with conditions attached? This article argues that Germany, the member state with the most fiscal resources, acts as the eu 's status quo power. Often enjoying high indispensability and limited vulnerability, it prefers the regulation of national fiscal policies over European capacity building. However, when faced with threats to its own economic model and to European polity stability, Germany, again and again, makes targeted fiscal concessions. Developing and testing arguments derived from national material interests and foreign policy orientations, the article documents Germany's significant but highly ambiguous role in the creation of two recent eu instruments with strong fiscal components: the Next Generation recovery plan and the joint purchasing of energy. The findings have implications not only for Germany's European policy, but for eu fiscal politics and European integration more generally.