An Evolutionary Game Study on the Collaborative Mechanism for Construction Digitalization Among Governments, Contractors, and Service Providers

As technologies such as Building Information Modeling, the Internet of Things, and cloud computing spread, digital transformation in construction is widely seen as a path to greater efficiency and sustainability. Yet multiple stakeholders and persistent information asymmetry often hamper genuine cooperation, undermining digitalization’s potential. This study constructs an evolutionary game model involving government, contractor, and service providers under incomplete information. A combined subsidies-and-penalties mechanism is introduced to derive replicator dynamics and identify conditions for an evolutionary stable strategy. Numerical simulations show that insufficient subsidies and weak penalties typically result in a “low-level equilibrium,” with superficial or absent cooperation. Strengthening government subsidies and imposing more stringent penalties triggers a threshold effect, significantly increasing contractors’ and service providers’ willingness to participate, thereby leading to a stable cooperative equilibrium. Service providers, in particular, influence success or failure through their cost–benefit structures, which affect contractors’ confidence in adopting digital solutions. This research extends evolutionary game theory to a three-party construction digitalization context, providing practical guidance for balanced subsidy–penalty strategies and incentive-compatible mechanisms. Overall, it underscores how coordinated policies and stakeholder alignment can overcome moral hazard and achieve sustainable digital transformation in the construction sector.