Optimal pricing for two competing brands under the asymmetric remanufacturing: Nash game theory formulations

Under the Extended Producer Responsibility Act, this paper develops Nash game models to optimize remanufacturing and pricing strategies for two brands (namely, $ B_{1} $ and $ B_{2} $) of a product whose manufacturers compete in a duopoly market. We contribute to the literature by the simultaneous consideration of the external competition between two brands and the internal competition between new and remanufactured $ B_{1} $ products. It is assumed that $ B_{1} $, having a greater customer acceptance level in terms of the new products, is willing to do remanufacturing of its high-quality used products. However, the customers' acceptance level of the remanufactured $ B_{1} $ products might be more or less than that of the new $ B_{2} $ products. As in practice, the volume of remanufactured $ B_{1} $ products is not allowed to exceed that of its high-quality used products. The results show that the profits of manufacturer $ B_{1} $ are lesser under the remanufacturing case. Also, when the acceptance level of new B2 is more than that of the remanufactured $ B_{1} $ products, with a reduction in the acceptance level of the remanufactured $ B_{1} $ products, the profits of two manufacturers will increase.