Evolutionary game analysis of operational safety supervision in complex underground public spaces

Purpose Ensuring operational safety in complex underground public spaces (CUPS) requires an effective supervision system. This study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model to analyze the strategic interactions among the government, supervisors and operators in safety supervision. By identifying equilibrium points within the system, the study examines how different supervision policies, incentives and supervisory mechanisms impact safety compliance and system stability. The findings provide targeted recommendations for optimizing safety supervision frameworks. Design/methodology/approach Utilizing evolutionary game theory, this study analyzes the strategic behaviors of the government, supervisor and operator within the context of operational safety supervision in CUPS. MATLAB simulations examine equilibrium states and assess the impact of different supervision scenarios. Findings The results show that with initial low government supervision and limited operator compliance, the operator’s safety supervision gradually diminishes until nearly zero. However, increasing government supervisory efforts encourage the operator to improve safety supervision, progressively attaining comprehensive safety supervision. Furthermore, government incentive policies and operator technological innovations positively influence safety supervision, particularly during the initial stages of safety system development. Lastly, pivotal factors such as government subsidies and operator costs significantly affect game behavior in scenarios characterized by neutral supplier and owner attitudes and government supervisory inclinations. Practical implications The findings enhance China’s supervisory system for CUPS safety supervision, bolstering related supervisory frameworks to optimize CUPS’s continued and sustainable development. Originality/value This research comprehensively applies evolutionary game theory to analyze the strategic interactions among government, supervisors and operators in the context of operational safety supervision in complex underground public spaces (CUPS). Additionally, the study incorporates dynamic payment conditions and government incentive policies to simulate real-world scenarios, offering a detailed examination of the factors influencing the effectiveness of safety supervision systems.