Is It Permissible to Make Moral Arguments against Metaphysical Theories?

I reply to K. Morozov’s paper “The Normative Problem for Panpsychism”. I show that his argument against panpsychism which is based on the demonstration of the normative problem actually is a moral argument against a metaphysical theory. I draw an analogy between this argument of K. Morozov and M. Heller’s moral argument against modal realism. I examine the extent to which arguments of this kind can be permissible in philosophical discussion. I consider three modes of relations between moral facts (if there are any in the world) and metaphysical facts. These modes can be called obstruction, testimony, and difference in the degree of reasonable credence. I conclude that none of these modes of relations allow for making moral arguments against metaphysical theories. Then I consider the pragmatic interpretation of this moral argument and find it the only acceptable one. I also present two independent arguments against the thesis of sentientism: from the moral status of the good memory of dead people, and from the possibility of moral status of God.