Malfunctionalism and the Liar in advance
A common assessment of Liar sentences is that they malfunction and fail to say what they appear to say. The purpose of this article is to highlight a couple of limitations of this “malfunctionalism”, to which end two recalcitrant paradoxes will be presented. The first shows that there are Liar paradoxes where malfunctionalism must concede that there is no way of stating what is apparently the case. The second is the Yablo-style infinite sequence Liar, which is out of malfunctionalism’s reach altogether and in need of a different solution.
Authors
- William Bondi Knowles (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7986-0502)
Institutions
- Burn Institute (US)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Thought A Journal of Philosophy
- Published
- 2025-01-01
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.5840/tht202552243
- Primary Topic
- Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00