Evolution over revolution: How judicial adaptation undermined Roosevelt’s court-packing plan

This paper examines the 1937 Court-Packing Plan proposed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, focusing on how the Supreme Court’s independence persisted despite political threats. The study argues that the failure of the plan was not solely due to political opposition but primarily because of the Court’s gradual jurisprudential evolution toward a more deferential stance on economic regulation, which culminated in the cases West Coast Hotel v. Parrish (1937) and NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. (1937). These decisions reassured Congress that the Court no longer obstructed economic reform, diminishing the necessity of Roosevelt’s proposal. By analyzing key cases before 1937—such as Nebbia v. New York (1934) and Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell (1934)—this paper refutes the traditional “switch in time” narrative, demonstrating that the Court’s ideological transformation was a gradual process rather than an abrupt reaction to political pressure. Furthermore, the study highlights the inherent tension between judicial independence and policy-driven political agendas, emphasizing how threats to the judiciary provoke intense political realignments. Finally, this paper draws parallels to contemporary debates on Supreme Court reform, illustrating the continued divisiveness of judicial restructuring. The findings underscore that judicial independence—and by extension, the rule of law—is not self-sustaining but depends on whether society values it above immediate political gains.