In Defense of Pragmatism

ABSTRACT In the ethics of belief debate, pragmatism is the thesis that practical considerations can be reasons for belief. By contrast, evidentialism is the thesis that only evidence can provide reasons for belief. Intuitions about specific cases seem to lend support to pragmatism. However, many evidentialists explain away these intuitive judgments by claiming that (a) there can be practical reasons to bring about a belief, and (b) in these cases one should bring about such beliefs. I argue that (a) and (b) are double‐edged responses: if either of these claims is true, pragmatism is also true. Based on the assumption that either (a) or (b) is true, I provide three new arguments for pragmatism. I also consider evidentialist variants of the above response holding that practical considerations are reasons to intend, want, or try to bring about the belief that p. I argue that these variants are equally problematic.