The human right to freedom of thought—operationalising a disputed right in the context of neurotechnologies

ABSTRACT This article contributes to the operationalisation of the right to freedom of thought by further defining its scope of protection and elaborating criteria to evaluate violations of this right. It is argued that this right does not only protect views or ideas of a certain complexity or importance, but rather all kinds of thoughts and thinking as a process and an ability as such. Yet not every disclosure and influence of thoughts and thinking constitute a violation, but a certain severity threshold must be met. To determine whether this threshold is reached, the means, duration, intensity, and effect of the intervention as well as the individual circumstances of the case, such as consent, intention and vulnerability, could be considered. Neurotechnologies offer qualitatively new forms of intervention, as they facilitate a direct link to the human brain. The right to freedom of thought seems therefore particularly relevant in this context.