If corporates are culpable, why not robots?

This paper investigates the complex issues surrounding the applicability of principles of criminal liability to robots and artificial intelligence entities (AIEs). It argues that if criminal law imposes liability on corporate entities, why not apply the same principles to AIEs? To systematically address the issues related to this pivotal question, the discussion is framed within the traditions of normative legal theory and a comparative phenomenological approach. Departing from the current scholarly debate on the societal implications of artificial intelligence, this paper divulges into the essence of criminal liability for AIEs. The challenges posed by AIEs are discussed first; along with their theoretical foundations and practical implications. Second, the origins and theoretical tenets of corporate criminal liability are examined, drawing and articulating an analogy between these two types of legal liability. The paper concludes that, given the complex modus operandi of AIEs, the most effective approach to addressing criminal and civil offences committed by these entities is to deploy and apply principles of vicarious and strict liability.