Power in the Pre‐Decisional Stage: Stability Sentences and Non‐Decisions in Coalition Agreements in Israel and Norway

ABSTRACT Non‐decisions are manifestations of power in the policy process. This paper shows that in parliamentary democracies with coalition governments, stability sentences in coalition agreements entail non‐decisions. These sentences address policies which coalition partners explicitly decide not to change. Since coalition agreements provide the policy agenda for the incoming government, explicit statements maintaining the status quo are non‐decisions that matter for future policymaking. Most research on coalition agreements focuses on changes that the incoming coalition wishes to promote. This paper investigates which issues coalition partners choose to safeguard from potential change and what can explain why they do so. The paper is based on an analysis of all coalition agreements from the last four decades in Norway and Israel. It finds that stability sentences address divisive and conflict‐laden policy issues that, if placed on the agenda, could threaten the survival of the coalition. Moreover, they are repeated often across multiple government coalitions and represent a policy agenda that is distinct from the usual decision‐oriented one.