A commentary on “What is it like to be a tetrachromat?” by Michael Newall

Analytical examinations of subjective experience are hampered by the first-person limitation described by Nagel (1974) in “What is it like to be a bat?”. This comment compares two examinations on the nature of subjective experience: Michael Newall’s (2025) analysis of tetrachromatic colour perception and Jordi Galiano-Landeira and Núria Peñuelas’ (2025) exploration of AI phenomenological consciousness within panpsychism. Newall examined whether tetrachromats perceive entirely novel colours or finer gradations of known ones, using analogies with dichromats and empirical evidence. Newall argued for the possibility of novel colour experiences. Galiano-Landeira and Peñuelas proposed that the analog/non-analog distinction is user-dependent, implying that AI could be phenomenologically conscious despite digital information processing. Although both works stemmed from completely different starting points, they emphasize the continuity of experience besides the perceptual resolution, questioning anthropocentric and chauvinistic biases in phenomenal consciousness studies. The structuralist perspective on colour quality spaces is also discussed to further delve into tetrachromatic perception, suggesting that tetrachromats might experience both finer gradations and novel colours.