The Myth of Neutrality: Judicial Review, Ideology, and Constitutional Interpretation in Pakistan and the United Kingdom

This article critically examines the notion of judicial neutrality in the context of constitutional interpretation and judicial review, using Pakistan and the United Kingdom as comparative case studies. While courts often project an image of impartiality and legal objectivity, their rulings in politically sensitive cases reveal underlying ideological and institutional influences. The purpose of this study is to deconstruct the myth of neutrality and to explore how judicial decisions are shaped by broader political and cultural contexts, especially in systems with divergent constitutional frameworks—one codified and fragile, the other uncodified yet resilient. Employing a qualitative, doctrinal research method, the article analyses landmark judicial decisions, constitutional texts, and scholarly critiques to expose the value-laden nature of constitutional adjudication. In both jurisdictions, the judiciary has at times reinforced dominant political structures under the guise of legal reasoning, while at other moments it has asserted democratic values through selective activism. The key finding is that claims to judicial neutrality often mask deeper ideological commitments and strategic institutional positioning. Recognising this complexity is essential for a more transparent and accountable model of constitutional governance. The article ultimately calls for a candid reassessment of the role of courts in shaping constitutional meaning within contested democratic orders. This article interrogates the assumption of judicial neutrality in constitutional adjudication by comparing the practice of judicial review in Pakistan and the United Kingdom. While courts in both jurisdictions often purport to act as neutral arbiters applying objective legal principles, their decisions frequently reflect underlying ideological frameworks and political contexts. By examining key case law and the constitutional arrangements in each country, this article contends that the rhetoric of neutrality conceals the inherently political nature of constitutional interpretation. The analysis underscores the need to reassess the normative claims of judicial objectivity, particularly in societies marked by deep constitutional and political contestation.