Vzpomínka bez paměti. Smrt jako mezní fenomén života v Husserlově fenomenologii

In his phenomenology after Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, Husserl increasingly thematizes the problem of the immortality of the transcendental ego together with its infinite immanent flow. This creates the problem of the meaning of the experience of consciousness before birth and after death. The infinity of the immanent current is itself the constituted yield of the life of the ego. In this sense, it is an independent stage of constitution, whose source is the living, flowing presence. Taking this difference into account gives rise to the problem: how is it possible to make sense of an experience in which the ego was not (unconscious or pre-conscious states, dreamless sleep, death) accessible. We show that these connections cannot be satisfactorily accessible without accounting for the alertness (and maturity) of the ego that is conducting the phenomenological investigation.