The Double Failure of Contractual Governance and Its Overcoming: Legal Composition and Institutional Improvement of the “Trusteeship” Property Management Model

本文以“契约治理的双重失灵”为理论框架,探讨传统物业模式与信托制物业模式的法律构成及制度完善路径。传统委托合同制因信息不对称、权利失衡与监督缺位导致“第一重失灵”,表现为业主知情权受限、物业资金管理不透明等问题。信托制物业通过《信托法》重构委托人、受托人与受益人的三方法律关系,以信托财产独立性、受益人利益优先原则及资金透明化机制,试图破解传统治理困境。然而实践中暴露出“第二重失灵”,即监察权责模糊、业主参与不足、物业企业能力薄弱等新问题。文章以成都市武侯区为实证对象,分析其政策设计、党组织引领协同机制及实施成效,并揭示“失灵”的具体表现。双重失灵的根源在于法律衔接漏洞、监察机制权责交叉及主体能力鸿沟。对此,本文提出三层次制度完善路径,既为基层治理现代化提供理论支撑,也为信托制物业的全国推广提出操作性政策建议。This paper takes “the double failure of contractual governance” as the theoretical framework to discuss the legal composition and institutional improvement paths of the traditional property model and the trusteeship property model. The traditional entrusted contract system is characterized by information asymmetry, power imbalance and lack of supervision, resulting in the “first failure”, which is manifested in the restriction of the owners’ right to know and the lack of transparency in the management of property funds. Through the Trust Law, the trusteeship property reconstructs the tripartite legal relationship between the principal, trustee and beneficiary, and tries to solve the traditional governance dilemma by the independence of trust property, the principle of giving priority to the interests of beneficiaries, and the mechanism of transparency of funds. However, the practice has revealed the “second failure”, i.e., the blurring of monitoring rights and responsibilities, insufficient participation of owners, weak capacity of property enterprises and other new problems. The article takes Wuhou District of Chengdu City as an empirical object, analyzes its policy design, the synergistic mechanism led by the Party building and its implementation effectiveness, and reveals the specific manifestations of the “failure”. The root causes of the double failure lie in the loopholes in the law, the intersection of powers and responsibilities in the monitoring mechanism, and the gap in the capacity of the main body. In this regard, this paper proposes a three-level system improvement path, which not only provides theoretical support for the modernization of grass-roots governance, but also puts forward operational policy recommendations for the nationwide promotion of trusteeship property.

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Publication Details

Journal
Dispute Settlement
Published
2025-01-01
DOI
https://doi.org/10.12677/ds.2025.115189
Primary Topic
Regional Development and Environment
Type
article
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article

The Double Failure of Contractual Governance and Its Overcoming: Legal Composition and Institutional Improvement of the “Trusteeship” Property Management Model

钒珲 朱
Dispute Settlement
Regional Development and Environment
article

The Double Failure of Contractual Governance and Its Overcoming: Legal Composition and Institutional Improvement of the “Trusteeship” Property Management Model

钒珲 朱
article en

Abstract

本文以“契约治理的双重失灵”为理论框架,探讨传统物业模式与信托制物业模式的法律构成及制度完善路径。传统委托合同制因信息不对称、权利失衡与监督缺位导致“第一重失灵”,表现为业主知情权受限、物业资金管理不透明等问题。信托制物业通过《信托法》重构委托人、受托人与受益人的三方法律关系,以信托财产独立性、受益人利益优先原则及资金透明化机制,试图破解传统治理困境。然而实践中暴露出“第二重失灵”,即监察权责模糊、业主参与不足、物业企业能力薄弱等新问题。文章以成都市武侯区为实证对象,分析其政策设计、党组织引领协同机制及实施成效,并揭示“失灵”的具体表现。双重失灵的根源在于法律衔接漏洞、监察机制权责交叉及主体能力鸿沟。对此,本文提出三层次制度完善路径,既为基层治理现代化提供理论支撑,也为信托制物业的全国推广提出操作性政策建议。This paper takes “the double failure of contractual governance” as the theoretical framework to discuss the legal composition and institutional improvement paths of the traditional property model and the trusteeship property model. The traditional entrusted contract system is characterized by information asymmetry, power imbalance and lack of supervision, resulting in the “first failure”, which is manifested in the restriction of the owners’ right to know and the lack of transparency in the management of property funds. Through the Trust Law, the trusteeship property reconstructs the tripartite legal relationship between the principal, trustee and beneficiary, and tries to solve the traditional governance dilemma by the independence of trust property, the principle of giving priority to the interests of beneficiaries, and the mechanism of transparency of funds. However, the practice has revealed the “second failure”, i.e., the blurring of monitoring rights and responsibilities, insufficient participation of owners, weak capacity of property enterprises and other new problems. The article takes Wuhou District of Chengdu City as an empirical object, analyzes its policy design, the synergistic mechanism led by the Party building and its implementation effectiveness, and reveals the specific manifestations of the “failure”. The root causes of the double failure lie in the loopholes in the law, the intersection of powers and responsibilities in the monitoring mechanism, and the gap in the capacity of the main body. In this regard, this paper proposes a three-level system improvement path, which not only provides theoretical support for the modernization of grass-roots governance, but also puts forward operational policy recommendations for the nationwide promotion of trusteeship property.

Dispute SettlementVol. 11(05)
Openalex Percentile: Top 84%
Regional Development and Environment
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