An Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Aquatic Product Traceability System from a Multi-Actor Perspective

This study employs an evolutionary game theory framework to analyze the interactive learning, imitation, and strategic evolution among multiple actors within China’s aquatic product traceability system. It focuses on four types of strategic interactions: between fishers and the government, fishers and consumers, fishers who adopt the traceability system and those who do not, and between consumers who purchase traceable aquatic products and those who do not. The evolutionarily stable strategies and equilibrium outcomes in each game depend on the net benefits obtained and the various costs borne by each party. Among these factors, transaction costs within the traceability system play a particularly critical role in shaping stakeholder behavior. The lower the transaction costs, the more likely stakeholders are to adopt strategies that support or enhance the functioning of the system. Therefore, reducing the operational and transaction costs of the traceability system should be a key policy focus for the government. This includes efforts in policy and regulatory development, platform and infrastructure construction, and the improvement of information exchange mechanisms to foster sustainable development in aquaculture.