Meta-Epistemological Remarks on Certainty, Truthfulness, and Evidence: Prolegomena to a Possible Theory Explaining Their Interconnections

The paper discusses semantic and pragmatic relations among three concepts and terms: certainty, truth and evidence (obviousness), and provides prolegomena for a possible epistemological theory explaining how these epistemic values are interconnected. While pointing out questions to be considered and proposing some hypotheses concerning the nature of certainty and its connections with truth and evidence, special attention is given to the “Husserlian” context of the issue. An analysis of the cogito concludes the proposed discourse. I propose here that all statements related to immanence (the mind and mental acts) that are true, certain and evident at the same time are reflexive (refer to a mind or subject while performing another mental act), iterable (can be displayed ad infinitum) and deflationary (can be abbreviated).