Evaluating Joseph Fletcher’s Affirmation that Agapeic Love is Justice

This paper has five parts: (1) A First Defense of Fletcher’s Thesis that Agapeic Love is Justice: This section considers the almost immediate objection to this claim since justice demands punishment whereas love might not punish but forgive a criminal. In response, the paper notes that Fletcher begins with Augustine’s important affirmation that agapeic love needs a high degree of thoughtfulness and prudence, thereby distinguishing between emotional love and agapeic love such that whereas emotional love, for example, by a parent might be willing to forgive an adult child for a felony crime, agapeic love for a convicted felon can recognize that punishment is needed both for the felon to recognize the seriousness of one’s crime and for society to be protected against such a felon returning too easily to the repetition of such crimes. This section also explores the acceptance of the Aristotelian Principle noted by John Rawls which is crucial in helping to determine how an adult criminal is to be treated in response to that person’s responsibility. (2) A Fuller Development of Fletcher’s Thesis that Agapeic Love is Justice: Fletcher strongly agrees with Augustine’s important affirmation that agapeic love needs to be diligent love, love that is identical with practical wisdom. Consequently, even if we were to grant the approach of Augustine and Aquinas that justice is giving to each person what is their due, Fletcher points out that agapeic love needs to involve practical wisdom, that is, prudence, for a proper understanding of the many rights and obligations of individuals and groups in society. This prudent, agapeic love loves one’s neighbor as one loves oneself by not offending against the commandments, noted by Paul in Romans 13, 8-20, not committing adultery, not committing murder, not stealing, not giving false witness and not coveting. Such love is noted by Paul to be the fulfilment of the law. (3) Reflections on Korsgaard, Outka, Confucius, and Mencius: First, we examine Korsgaard’s argument that even familial love for one’s child necessarily implies that the parent should have justice for all children, indeed, for all persons. Consequently, this section shall argue all the more so that agapeic love, which involves at least love of all others such that their life, rationality, freedom, and dignity need to be affirmed and respected, necessarily asserts the intrinsic dignity of all others who can be loved as the self loves itself. Second, we examine the analysis of Gene Outka who agrees with Fletcher’s reading of Romans 13: 8-10 that love of neighbor involves not harming one’s neighbor by violating any of tencommandments condemning actions against one’s neighbor. Third, we consider the different approaches of Confucius and Mencius to justice and love and favor the approach of Mencius that great evils can only be overcome and transformed by great love. (4) Reflections on Frankena, Outka, Haring, Augustine, and Aquinas: This section evaluates the argument of Frankena that both the affirmation of persons through love towards them as having dignity and the affirmation of equal treatment of all through justice are two principles of moral philosophy irreducible to each other. This section further uses the analysis of Outka to support our evaluation of Frankena. Finally, in section (5), the paper considers agapeic love as a potential in all natural loves and uses the analyses of Haring, Augustine, and Aquinas to evaluate the overemphasis in Christian thought that agapeic love is especially to be commended in love as self-sacrifice. This section will argue, instead, that in all forms of human love noted by C. S. Lewis, whether affection, friendship, eros, or charity, we can find a realistic potential for agapeic love even if a person does not believe in God. There is no need to conceive of all human action as reducible to selfish action. Human action can take the generous form of loving one’s neighbor, even one’s enemy, as one loves oneself. For Augustine and Aquinas, such love comes first before explicit love of God in the order of psychological learning. Loving another self-sacrificially does not mean that one loves another more than oneself, rather one is loving the moral good of both the self and the other. Keywords: love, justice, Augustine, Aquinas, Mencius