Accidental Neoliberalism: Democratic Accountability in the Making of the Euro, 1957–92

Neoliberalism can be defined as the drive to shield capitalism from the scrutiny and accountability of democratic processes. This definition is particularly relevant to the creation of the euro, as it reflects some imbalances of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty creating the European Union (EU). The monetary union was designed to function with full independence, largely beyond the reach of democratic deliberations. This article investigates whether this outcome was intentional. It argues that the asymmetric structure of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was purposefully crafted, as the European policymakers involved in the negotiations were acutely aware of the imperfections of the system being developed. However, these shortcomings were not specifically aligned with a particular neoliberal ideology. Instead, this article shows they resulted from a broader set of concerns, primarily driven by a reluctance to centralise decision-making power at the EU level due to fears of losing aspects of national sovereignty. Understanding the unintentional nature of this outcome is crucial, as confusing what is accidental with what is deliberate can lead to misunderstandings about the motivations behind EMU and misconceive the paths for its reform.

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Publication Details

Journal
Contemporary European History
Published
2025-05-29
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1017/s0960777325000207
Citations
1
Primary Topic
European Monetary and Fiscal Policies
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
2.21
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article

Accidental Neoliberalism: Democratic Accountability in the Making of the Euro, 1957–92

Emmanuel Mourlon‐Druol
1 citations
Contemporary European History
European Monetary and Fiscal Policies
2.21
article

Accidental Neoliberalism: Democratic Accountability in the Making of the Euro, 1957–92

Emmanuel Mourlon‐Druol
article en
1 citations

Abstract

Neoliberalism can be defined as the drive to shield capitalism from the scrutiny and accountability of democratic processes. This definition is particularly relevant to the creation of the euro, as it reflects some imbalances of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty creating the European Union (EU). The monetary union was designed to function with full independence, largely beyond the reach of democratic deliberations. This article investigates whether this outcome was intentional. It argues that the asymmetric structure of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was purposefully crafted, as the European policymakers involved in the negotiations were acutely aware of the imperfections of the system being developed. However, these shortcomings were not specifically aligned with a particular neoliberal ideology. Instead, this article shows they resulted from a broader set of concerns, primarily driven by a reluctance to centralise decision-making power at the EU level due to fears of losing aspects of national sovereignty. Understanding the unintentional nature of this outcome is crucial, as confusing what is accidental with what is deliberate can lead to misunderstandings about the motivations behind EMU and misconceive the paths for its reform.

Contemporary European HistoryVol. 35
European University Institute (IT)
Openalex Percentile: Top 14%
European Monetary and Fiscal Policies
2.21
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