Un análisis crítico del argumento de Edgington contra la consideración veritativo-funcional del condicional y sobre su consideración positiva

In this work, I will analyze Edgington's proposal in the article Do Conditionals have Truth-Conditions?, emphasizing her criticism of the truth-functional account of the conditional and her positive account of it. I will begin by contextualizing the debate about the conditional in which Edginton's article is situated, then I will summarize the central argument of the article against the truth-functional account and in favor of her positive account. I will demonstrate some weaknesses in Edginton's argument, since the truth-functional account of the conditional may not be as counterintuitive as the author suggests, and her positive account of the conditional does not satisfy the possibility of being the universal account of it. I conclude by posing the importance of explicitly interpreting any conditional sentence.