Participation of Soviet Aviation in the Rostov Offensive Operation (January – February 1943)

Introduction. The article is devoted to the study of the combat work of the Soviet aviation during the Rostov offensive operation in January – February 1943, summing up the results of air battles and identifying the reasons that influenced the effectiveness of the Soviet aviation. This page of history still retains many gaps, one of which is the lack of a comprehensive study of the issues of the incompleteness of this operation. The study of the problem posed will reveal the main reason for the failure of the offensive of the Southern Front in the winter of 1943 on the lines of the Mius River in the Rostov region. Materials and methods. The principle of historicism and a systems approach are taken as a methodological basis for the presented study. Problem-chronological, historicalcomparative, historical-descriptive, and historical-genetic methods characteristic of historical research were used. The source base includes unpublished documents of various kinds from the funds of the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, as well as published materials. Analysis. During the Rostov offensive operation, units and formations of the 4th and 8th Air Armies were distributed to cover the advancing ground forces of the Southern Front, which facilitated the advance of strike and mobile groups. Fighters were engaged in aerial reconnaissance of the enemy’s position and escort of their assault air groups. Assault groups took advantage of the surprise of the attack and the covert approach to the target. Night bomber aviation was less active, and day bombers did not conduct combat sorties at all. There was often a shortage of fuel and lubricants and other means of supplying aviation units and formations. Results. Due to weather conditions, the availability of serviceable equipment and fuels and lubricants, the unpreparedness of airfields, and the progress and results of combat work, aviation depended on its capabilities. The identified difficulties in conducting combat operations by Soviet aviation allow us to speak about previously unknown factors and reasons for the incompleteness of the Rostov offensive operation of 1943.