Lex Specialis as a Reason-Giving Norm

Abstract Lex specialis is a fundamental tenet of law. It is particularly important in resolving conflicts between international humanitarian law ( IHL ) and human rights law ( HRL ). Nonetheless, in recent years, there has been growing interest in developing an alternative approach that harmonises IHL and HRL . This approach emphasises the mutual reinforcement of these two branches of law, rather than their opposition. However, the interaction between the harmonising approach and lex specialis remains poorly understood. This article proposes a reasoning framework for understanding lex specialis, including how it can be defeated. It explains that lex specialis can be seen as a second-order norm that prioritises certain norms over others by providing reasons that work in favour of the first group and against the second group. Nevertheless, the reasons given by lex specialis can be defeated by other reasons, thus reversing the primacy of specific norms over general ones.