Loper Bright and Judicial Review of Ratemaking

describing what Merrill calls "the Scalia doctrine," or the interpretation of Chevron that Justice Scalia adopted and promoted and that eventually became the way that courts and commenters understood Chevron, even if that interpretation was not clearly required by Justice Stevens' opinion in Chevron itself).4 Indeed, this assumption about statutory ambiguity is present in the dissent's opinion, too.See Loper Bright, 144 S. Ct. at 2294 (Kagan, J., dissenting) ("Congress knows that it does not-in fact cannot-write perfectly complete statutes.It knows that those statutes will inevitably contain ambiguities that some other actor will have to resolve . . . . ").5 There is a way to read the majority as saying that in fact only one institution is competent to resolve the statutory ambiguity at issue, because the other institution would be prohibited by the Constitution from resolving that statutory ambiguity under some theory of separation of powers.For instance, Chief Justice Roberts may be motivated by the idea that the interpretation of statutes involves the judicial power and