Truthful Double Auction for Multiple Secondary Operator Spectrum Sharing With Flexible Bidding

Due to the fixed bidding and matching process in traditional sealed-bid spectrum auctions, participants with overlarge demands may not be matched, resulting in suboptimal total social welfare and low spectrum utilization. To address this problem, we propose a flexible bidding double spectrum auction scheme, where each buyer can submit both a base bid and an additional bid based on their basic spectrum demand and additional spectrum needs. Then we propose a two-step spectrum auction mechanism: the Sort-based matChing And vickRey Pricing (SCARP) mechanism for base bids in the first step, and the Fairness-based aLlocation And Pricing (FLAP) mechanism for additional bids in the second step. Furthermore, we prove that the proposed mechanism satisfies the truthfulness, budget balance, and individual rationality properties. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed flexible bidding scheme outperforms the benchmark scheme, significantly improving the social welfare and spectrum utilization.