Issue of Animal Thinking: Immanuel Kant’s Perspective

The article addresses the problem of animal thinking, an issue that remained unresolved within Kant’s philosophy. Reflecting on animal sensibility, Kant posits that animals possess intuitions, representations, and sensations, yet lack understanding ( Verstand ) and reason ( Vernunft ). He criticizes the Cartesian conviction of the animal-machine and places animals under the protection of an “indirect duty” in the Metaphysics of Morals . However, in the Anthropology, Kant equates animals with things, thereby approaching Cartesianism, and asserts that animals can be treated arbitrarily. The article attempts to elucidate the rationale behind this transformation in Kant’s position. It is argued that the decision to align animals with things might have helped overcome certain problems arising from the inclusion of non-human agents into Kant’s anthropocentric system. Contemporary Kantian scholarship moves beyond Cartesianism and engages with both pre-critical and critical Kant in the context of current research confirming that animals possess, at a minimum, sensibility. The discussion regarding their cognitive status is situated within the debate on conceptualism and non-conceptualism in Kant. The article posits that, despite Kant’s inclination toward conceptualism concerning humans, he allows for non-conceptualism when discussing animals. Arguments supporting this thesis are drawn from Kant’s original texts, as well as from the models proposed by J. Hutton, L. Allais, and L. Stevenson. Allowing for non-conceptualist types of perception makes it possible to suggest that the foundation of animal sensory intuitions might consist solely of space, without time. Within the framework of Kantian philosophy, such approaches cannot be consistently defended concerning human perception. However, Kant’s theory demonstrates the potential to incorporate novel non-human types of non-conceptual awareness, and developments in this area prove promising for epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics.

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Publication Details

Journal
Russian Journal of Philosophical Sciences
Published
2025-03-01
DOI
https://doi.org/10.30727/0235-1188-2025-68-2-67-87
Citations
1
Primary Topic
Philosophical Ethics and Theory
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
17.27

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article

Issue of Animal Thinking: Immanuel Kant’s Perspective

Natalia Yu. Chepeleva
1 citations
Russian Journal of Philosophical Sciences
Philosophical Ethics and Theory
17.27
article

Issue of Animal Thinking: Immanuel Kant’s Perspective

Natalia Yu. Chepeleva
article en
1 citations

Abstract

The article addresses the problem of animal thinking, an issue that remained unresolved within Kant’s philosophy. Reflecting on animal sensibility, Kant posits that animals possess intuitions, representations, and sensations, yet lack understanding ( Verstand ) and reason ( Vernunft ). He criticizes the Cartesian conviction of the animal-machine and places animals under the protection of an “indirect duty” in the Metaphysics of Morals . However, in the Anthropology, Kant equates animals with things, thereby approaching Cartesianism, and asserts that animals can be treated arbitrarily. The article attempts to elucidate the rationale behind this transformation in Kant’s position. It is argued that the decision to align animals with things might have helped overcome certain problems arising from the inclusion of non-human agents into Kant’s anthropocentric system. Contemporary Kantian scholarship moves beyond Cartesianism and engages with both pre-critical and critical Kant in the context of current research confirming that animals possess, at a minimum, sensibility. The discussion regarding their cognitive status is situated within the debate on conceptualism and non-conceptualism in Kant. The article posits that, despite Kant’s inclination toward conceptualism concerning humans, he allows for non-conceptualism when discussing animals. Arguments supporting this thesis are drawn from Kant’s original texts, as well as from the models proposed by J. Hutton, L. Allais, and L. Stevenson. Allowing for non-conceptualist types of perception makes it possible to suggest that the foundation of animal sensory intuitions might consist solely of space, without time. Within the framework of Kantian philosophy, such approaches cannot be consistently defended concerning human perception. However, Kant’s theory demonstrates the potential to incorporate novel non-human types of non-conceptual awareness, and developments in this area prove promising for epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics.

Russian Journal of Philosophical SciencesVol. 68(2)
Lomonosov Moscow State University (RU), Moscow State University (TJ)
Russian Science Foundation
Openalex Percentile: Top 2%
Philosophical Ethics and Theory
17.27
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