Smartphones: Parts of Our Minds? Or Parasites?

Smartphones are often assumed to be obvious examples of cognitive extension. We offer reasons to reject this assessment, arguing that modern smartphones (and the apps installed on them) are not cognitive extensions after all. Modern smartphones are designed to manipulate the attention and behaviour of users in ways that further the interests of the corporations that built them. In this they are importantly different from resources typically associated with the extended mind—such as notebooks, Scrabble racks and maps—which are not designed to manipulate or exploit users (even if they can be corrupted to these ends in some cases). It is not plausible for a part of the cognitive system to be designed to thwart the goals and desires of the user in the way a smartphone is. Given this, we argue, modern smartphones are better understood as external to, but symbiotic with, our minds, and, sometimes even parasitic on us, rather than as cognitive extensions. Thinking about them in this way better reflects the true nature of our relationship with them, and the ways that the relationship can both benefit and harm us.

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Publication Details

Journal
Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Published
2025-05-26
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2025.2504070
Citations
6
Primary Topic
Embodied and Extended Cognition
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
8.59
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article

Smartphones: Parts of Our Minds? Or Parasites?

Rachael L. Brown, Robert C. Brooks
6 citations
Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Embodied and Extended Cognition
8.59
article

Smartphones: Parts of Our Minds? Or Parasites?

Rachael L. Brown, Robert C. Brooks
article en
6 citations

Abstract

Smartphones are often assumed to be obvious examples of cognitive extension. We offer reasons to reject this assessment, arguing that modern smartphones (and the apps installed on them) are not cognitive extensions after all. Modern smartphones are designed to manipulate the attention and behaviour of users in ways that further the interests of the corporations that built them. In this they are importantly different from resources typically associated with the extended mind—such as notebooks, Scrabble racks and maps—which are not designed to manipulate or exploit users (even if they can be corrupted to these ends in some cases). It is not plausible for a part of the cognitive system to be designed to thwart the goals and desires of the user in the way a smartphone is. Given this, we argue, modern smartphones are better understood as external to, but symbiotic with, our minds, and, sometimes even parasitic on us, rather than as cognitive extensions. Thinking about them in this way better reflects the true nature of our relationship with them, and the ways that the relationship can both benefit and harm us.

Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Australian National University (AU)
Openalex Percentile: Top 2%
Embodied and Extended Cognition
8.59
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Smartphones: Parts of Our Minds? Or Parasites? — Rachael L. Brown, Robert C. Brooks · Australasian Journal of Philosophy (2025) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS