Resurrektion der Natur

Abstract This article revisits Marx’s notion of Gattungswesen and his suggestion that we should consider nature as our inorganic body. Both are essential to the distinctive kind of dialectical and emancipatory naturalism he espouses. I will first revisit Marx’s fundamental notion of Gattungswesen to show that it is not speciesist and essentialist. Contrary to what the English translation of Marx’s term suggests, being a Gattungswesen does not amount to being a “species being.” To clarify the deep contrast between genus and species, Gattung and Art, I will turn to considerations in Hegel that are in the background of Marx’s conception. In the next step, I will examine the special relationship that a Gattungswesen has with the nature that surrounds it. Considering nature as the inorganic body of the human does not involve the defence of a one-sided appropriation and domination of nature, but aims for what Marx’s calls the “resurrection of nature”. Finally, I will characterise Marx’s position as a distinctive kind of naturalism: (i) as a naturalism that is neither hard nor soft, but dialectical; (i) as a naturalism that pursues an emancipatory agenda, not a reductive or therapeutic one.

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Publication Details

Journal
Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie
Published
2024-12-01
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2024-0064
Citations
1
Primary Topic
Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Hegel
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
4.22
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article

Resurrektion der Natur

Thomas Khurana
1 citations
Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie
Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Hegel
4.22
article

Resurrektion der Natur

Thomas Khurana
article en
1 citations

Abstract

Abstract This article revisits Marx’s notion of Gattungswesen and his suggestion that we should consider nature as our inorganic body. Both are essential to the distinctive kind of dialectical and emancipatory naturalism he espouses. I will first revisit Marx’s fundamental notion of Gattungswesen to show that it is not speciesist and essentialist. Contrary to what the English translation of Marx’s term suggests, being a Gattungswesen does not amount to being a “species being.” To clarify the deep contrast between genus and species, Gattung and Art, I will turn to considerations in Hegel that are in the background of Marx’s conception. In the next step, I will examine the special relationship that a Gattungswesen has with the nature that surrounds it. Considering nature as the inorganic body of the human does not involve the defence of a one-sided appropriation and domination of nature, but aims for what Marx’s calls the “resurrection of nature”. Finally, I will characterise Marx’s position as a distinctive kind of naturalism: (i) as a naturalism that is neither hard nor soft, but dialectical; (i) as a naturalism that pursues an emancipatory agenda, not a reductive or therapeutic one.

Deutsche Zeitschrift für PhilosophieVol. 72(6)
University of Potsdam (DE)
Openalex Percentile: Top 4%
Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Hegel
4.22
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