‘Through a glass darkly’: Dyslexic identity and hermeneutic injustice

Abstract This thought piece is written by four dyslexic disability scholars who reject dyslexia as an explanatory account. Instead, we adopt Lexism – the othering of dyslexics by normative practices and assumptions of literacy. In asserting a political position and our self‐identity, we explore our personal ambivalent experiences of diagnosis. The new concept of Lexism challenges the ‘power intellectual’ wielded by those who define and categorise dyslexics. We treat the ‘diagnosis’ of dyslexia as an expression of both Lexism (normative literacy) and the power intellectual. The purpose is to highlight the often inadequate diagnosis process, through the lens of ‘hermeneutic injustice’, which argues that the nomenclature surrounding dyslexia and other related psychological diagnoses leaves dyslexics disempowered and hampered in recognising instances of injustice. As dyslexic disability scholars, we struggled to understand our dyslexic identity; impaired by hermeneutic injustice, we made sense of our experiences of Lexism with difficulty. The injustice was present but invisible to us. This article focuses on how we came to perceive more clearly.

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Publication Details

Journal
British Journal of Special Education
Published
2025-05-27
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8578.70025
Primary Topic
Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

‘Through a glass darkly’: Dyslexic identity and hermeneutic injustice

Craig Collinson, Elizabeth Leung, Jessica Eccles‐Padwick, Julien Villeneuve
British Journal of Special Education
Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications
article

‘Through a glass darkly’: Dyslexic identity and hermeneutic injustice

Craig Collinson, Elizabeth Leung, Jessica Eccles‐Padwick, Julien Villeneuve
article en

Abstract

Abstract This thought piece is written by four dyslexic disability scholars who reject dyslexia as an explanatory account. Instead, we adopt Lexism – the othering of dyslexics by normative practices and assumptions of literacy. In asserting a political position and our self‐identity, we explore our personal ambivalent experiences of diagnosis. The new concept of Lexism challenges the ‘power intellectual’ wielded by those who define and categorise dyslexics. We treat the ‘diagnosis’ of dyslexia as an expression of both Lexism (normative literacy) and the power intellectual. The purpose is to highlight the often inadequate diagnosis process, through the lens of ‘hermeneutic injustice’, which argues that the nomenclature surrounding dyslexia and other related psychological diagnoses leaves dyslexics disempowered and hampered in recognising instances of injustice. As dyslexic disability scholars, we struggled to understand our dyslexic identity; impaired by hermeneutic injustice, we made sense of our experiences of Lexism with difficulty. The injustice was present but invisible to us. This article focuses on how we came to perceive more clearly.

British Journal of Special EducationVol. 52(2)
Edge Hill University (GB)
Openalex Percentile: Top 88%
Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications
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