Separation of Powers in Presidential and Parliamentary Systems: A Comparative Constitutional Analysis

This paper undertakes a comparative constitutional analysis of the principle of separation of powers in presidential and parliamentary systems of governance.Rooted in Montesquieu's theory, the doctrine aims to prevent the concentration of power by dividing governmental functions among the executive, legislature, and judiciary.While the presidential system, exemplified by the United States, adheres to a strict separation with a strong system of checks and balances, the parliamentary system, as seen in India and the United Kingdom, operates on a fusion of powers where the executive emerges from and remains accountable to the legislature.This study explores the structural, functional, and practical distinctions between these models, evaluating how each ensures accountability, maintains the rule of law, and responds to democratic demands.By analyzing judicial interpretations, constitutional provisions, and political practices, the paper assesses the strengths and limitations of both systems and highlights the evolving nature of separation of powers in modern democracies.