Priority Projects: Constituent Spending Demand and the Benefits of Congressional Credit Claiming

ABSTRACT How do incumbents in the US Congress turn federally funded district projects into electoral gains? Clarifying the connection between federal spending and congressional elections is critical for understanding the institution, as distributive benefits are theorized to enhance representation and facilitate broader policymaking. Extant studies argue that members of Congress use credit claiming for distributive benefits to cultivate an impression of influence, portraying themselves as uniquely capable of securing projects for their constituents. I develop a targeted theory of congressional distributive politics and argue that public support is granted to legislators for securing the right distributive benefits rather than securing the most distributive benefits. Using two survey experiments to explore constituent demand for different types of spending, I find robust evidence that legislators' ability to meet constituent demand shapes the effectiveness of their credit claims. I also find unexpected partisan convergence in the public's spending priorities and responsiveness to congressional credit claiming. This research advances the literature on congressional representation and offers a more complete account of the politics around congressional spending.