A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Development of New Energy Vehicle Industry Considering Environmental Friendliness under Carbon Tax and Subsidy Policies

In response to the country's policy of actively promoting the consumption of new energy vehicles and fostering the rapid development of the new energy vehicle industry, a tripartite evolutionary game model involving vehicle manufacturers, consumers, and the government is constructed. At the same time, according to the different subsidy objects, three models of government subsidies, carbon tax, environmental friendliness and other factors are considered. Ultimately, MATLAB software is utilized for numerical simulations to analyze the impact of relevant factors on the strategic choices of the three parties involved in the game. The results indicate that: (1) When subsidies for vehicle manufacturer surpass a certain threshold, it affects the government's strategic decision-making, shifting from an early subsidy strategy to a later non-subsidy strategy. (2) Consumer subsidies are directly proportional to sales of new energy vehicles. Increasing these subsidies can effectively promote the growth of the new energy vehicle industry. (3) When the government subsidizes both vehicle manufacturers and consumers, and the subsidies surpass a certain threshold, the time required for all parties to reach a stable state is shorter compared to subsidizing only vehicle manufacturers. This combination strategy is more conducive to the development of the new energy vehicle industry. (4) Both the environmental friendliness of vehicles and carbon tax policies positively influence the development of the new energy vehicle industry. As the environmental friendliness of vehicles increases, consumers are more likely to purchase new energy vehicles.