Materialism and Mental Manyism

The Mental Problem of the Many suggests that Materialism implies Mental Manyism: if human beings are material objects, then there are millions of conscious human subjects wherever we thought there was just one. Previous discussions of this problem focus on Mental Manyism, and whether it is substantially harder to live with than ordinary Manyism (about clouds, chairs, trees, etc.). But even if it is, that’ll count against materialism only if none of the other solutions to the Problem of the Many solves the Mental Problem of the Many. If some other solution works, then Materialism won’t imply Mental Manyism after all. I contend that Materialism does in fact imply Mental Manyism. Here I argue that two of the leading solutions to the Problem of the Many — supervaluationism and vague objecthood — fail to address the Mental Problem of the Many, even if they succeed in addressing the ordinary Problem of the Many. It turns out that we (and consciousness) are a special case in more ways relevant to this problem than just one.