Institutional Racism without Racist Ideology: A Critique of Tommie Shelby's Marxist Theory of Racism

This paper critically assesses Tommie Shelby’s Marxist definition of racism as a kind of ideology. I argue that institutional racism does not necessarily presuppose the Marxist idea of racist ideology, although it always presupposes the idea of race. The idea of race that is necessary to account for institutional racism is clarified. This paper has three main sections. I first analyze (in §1) the Marxist conception of ideology and explain its relationship to institutional racism. Marxist ideology is pejorative in that it entails cognitive distortion for those in the grip of ideology. Hence, Shelby’s Marxist conception of racism—“racism is racist ideology”—entails that racists are necessarily in the grip of cognitively distorted beliefs. Against this view, I argue (in §2) that it is possible to imagine a form of institutional racism that involves racial cognition but no cognitive distortion, hence no ideology in the pejorative sense. The theoretical portion of my paper (§3) analyzes Shelby’s analysis of race and draws attention to a significant theoretical problem (that I call “Shelby’s dilemma”) plaguing Shelby’s conception of racism.

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Publication Details

Journal
Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy
Published
2025-05-27
DOI
https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.7661
Primary Topic
Political Philosophy and Ethics
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

Institutional Racism without Racist Ideology: A Critique of Tommie Shelby's Marxist Theory of Racism

Alberto G. Urquidez
Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy
Political Philosophy and Ethics
article

Institutional Racism without Racist Ideology: A Critique of Tommie Shelby's Marxist Theory of Racism

Alberto G. Urquidez
article en

Abstract

This paper critically assesses Tommie Shelby’s Marxist definition of racism as a kind of ideology. I argue that institutional racism does not necessarily presuppose the Marxist idea of racist ideology, although it always presupposes the idea of race. The idea of race that is necessary to account for institutional racism is clarified. This paper has three main sections. I first analyze (in §1) the Marxist conception of ideology and explain its relationship to institutional racism. Marxist ideology is pejorative in that it entails cognitive distortion for those in the grip of ideology. Hence, Shelby’s Marxist conception of racism—“racism is racist ideology”—entails that racists are necessarily in the grip of cognitively distorted beliefs. Against this view, I argue (in §2) that it is possible to imagine a form of institutional racism that involves racial cognition but no cognitive distortion, hence no ideology in the pejorative sense. The theoretical portion of my paper (§3) analyzes Shelby’s analysis of race and draws attention to a significant theoretical problem (that I call “Shelby’s dilemma”) plaguing Shelby’s conception of racism.

Ergo an Open Access Journal of PhilosophyVol. 12(0)
James Madison University (US)
Openalex Percentile: Top 86%
Political Philosophy and Ethics
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