Judicial empowerment of chief justices in Central Europe through supranational means: Judicial self-defense or judicial self-dealing?

Abstract Chief justices in Central Europe—defined as the presidents of the supreme court—are powerful and consequential actors. Politicians in the region are well aware of this fact and have sought to undermine, bypass, or replace them. This article shows that chief justices have, in many cases, fought back. It argues that the increased supranational protection of judicial independence in Europe has changed the dynamics between chief justices and their domestic governments and, more broadly, has increased the likelihood of judicial resistance by chief justices in the face of democratic decay. Chief justices can, under such conditions, leverage supranational institutions and transnational alliances to halt or slow down backsliding. At the same time, this article cautions against uncritical supranational support for chief justices, as they may also misuse or abuse supranational protection for personal or political gain. The article concludes with suggestions for how the strategies adopted by chief justices in Central Europe can be adapted in jurisdictions outside Europe, where supranational safeguards for judicial independence are less robust.