Signalling Safe-Conduct(s): The Fiscalisation of Market Access for Castilian and Catalan Traders in Flanders During the First Half of the Fifteenth Century

This article assesses the importance of two tax controversies in conditioning market access in fifteenth-century Bruges. It looks at diplomatic posturing on the management of this market and the conditions for partaking in its trade. The theory of ‘signalling’ is applied to highlight diplomatic stances and reveal the reasoning behind policy decisions including reprisals, taxes, and boycotts hitherto absent in the literature. Diplomatic, urban legal, and fiscal sources are consulted to reveal what the Castilians and Catalans, sizeable and organised merchant communities in Bruges, perceived as an existential threat to their trade—the ‘fiscalisation’ of market access. This article takes a comparative approach, employing the theory of signalling to determine the strategies of the various actors involved and their efficacy. The Duke of Burgundy and his administration emerge from this story as the prime agent in determining this equilibrium, with the Castilians and Catalans bringing their diplomatic and economic leverage to bear to prevent it. The city of Bruges, as lobbyist and interlocutor, was involved throughout attempting to find a balance between its many merchant communities. These cases offer historical insights into strategies of negotiation when the economic stakes are high.