Epistemic Democracy and Political Reconciliation

Abstract Epistemic democrats argue that democracy, given the right conditions, is more likely to produce better results than a single person or a group of experts. While epistocrats mobilise knowledge against democracy, epistemic democrats seek to mobilise knowledge for democracy. The Condorcet Jury Theorem, with its emphasis on questions about the competence, independence, and sincerity of voters, has been the most emblematic approach to democratic pathologies from an epistemic perspective. This article extrapolates such epistemic arguments and explores their theoretical potential for the analysis of political reconciliation, particularly in post-war contexts, transitions from political repression, and settler colonial societies. The argument is that although epistemic theories can shed some light on democratic dimensions of political reconciliation, they are ultimately limited when dealing with post-war debates, transitional justice dilemmas, and the predicaments of settler colonial societies. There are two main limitations: 1. Reconciliation primarily deals with political questions rather than misconceptions of facts or values in epistemic terms. 2. Reconciliation entails a political rupture and renegotiation of the established order, whereas epistemic theories typically work with the enhancement of existing institutions. These limitations are symptomatic of the fact that epistemic democracy tends to operate at the everyday level of “politics” and political reconciliation at the foundational level of “the political”.