Bootlegging Baptists: the logic of paternalistic collective action

In the public choice literature, campaigners for paternalistic lifestyle regulation have often been portrayed as ideological ‘Baptists’ fighting, or inadvertently colluding with, the self-interested ‘Bootleggers’ of industry. In the absence of collective and selective benefits, it is assumed that their strong moral beliefs are enough to overcome the free-rider problem and the paradox of participation that deter other individuals from taking collective action. This article looks at single-issue public health pressure groups in the UK and argues that the provision of funding from elite sources, especially the state, has created political entrepreneurs who have the characteristics of both Bootleggers and Baptists, in that they profit from their paternalistic political activism. In contrast to grass-roots campaign groups, whose activism incurs a cost to participants, these professional activists have an incentive to find new policy battles to fight after their initial aims have been achieved and to create permanent disequilibrium, leading to an escalation of demands and mission creep. In the absence of selective incentives and state funding, consumers who are adversely affected by the policies will not take collective action and potentially face an endless cycle of regulation.