Rotating chief justices in a democracy under stress: The Brazilian <i>Supremo Tribunal Federal</i> under Bolsonaro

Abstract This article addresses how successive chief justices (CJs) led the Brazilian Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF) during the government of Jair M. Bolsonaro. First, it describes the institutional setting of the CJ “rotating” model, which combines formal rules establishing a short, two-year term and an election among sitting justices with the informal rule of selecting the most senior member of the Court. Second, it describes how three sequential CJs made tactical choices in face of executive encroachments departing from that institutional framework. The article sustains that in examining the role of the Court as a central site of resistance, we must look more closely at the performance of its formal leadership. CJs adopted tactics resulting from a mix of their peculiar personal traits, contextual changes, and the incentives of the institutional setting. The article shows that incremental change in the Court’s approach to the executive’s encroachments happened through the exercise of judicial, administrative, and representative powers by successive CJs. The workings of the “rotating” model were important in setting the conditions for three different, successive approaches by the STF’s formal leadership during a period that posed an existential threat to the institution and to the democratic regime.