Research on Dynamic Role Remodelling of Global Supply Chain From the Perspective of Stackelberg Game

ABSTRACT Amid escalating Sino–US trade frictions, enterprises face mounting challenges related to uncertainty and the stability of global supply chains. In response, firms are increasingly pursuing cooperative strategies and structural reorganization to maintain competitiveness. Among these strategies, product patent licensing has emerged as a critical mechanism for redefining roles within the global supply chain. This study investigates a supply chain comprising two firms, where one firm produces and sells two complementary products while licensing one product to the other firm for competitive production and sales. By employing the Stackelberg game model, we analyse how patent licensing influences firms' decision‐making, profitability, product demand, consumer surplus and social welfare, with a particular focus on its implications for role repositioning in the global supply chain. Through mathematical modelling, we derive the optimal decisions of both firms before and after licensing. Our findings reveal that licensing generally leads to higher pricing and increased sales of licensed products but adversely affects the pricing and demand for complementary products. Notably, when the licensing fee is set at a moderate level, it maximizes the licensee's total profit. Furthermore, numerical experiments demonstrate that licensing typically enhances consumer surplus and improves social welfare in most scenarios, although excessively high licensing fees may diminish social welfare. These results underscore the strategic importance of role repositioning within global supply chains, enabling firms to sustain competitive advantages and maximize profits amidst Sino–US trade tensions. Importantly, this study highlights the potential of patent licensing as a tool for fostering collaboration and resilience in uncertain trade environments. The insights gained from this research offer valuable guidance for decision‐makers in formulating effective global supply chain management strategies and future‐oriented policies. This work contributes to the literature by providing a novel framework for understanding the interplay between patent licensing, role repositioning and supply chain dynamics under trade frictions, offering practical benefits for firms navigating complex international markets.

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Publication Details

Journal
Systems Research and Behavioral Science
Published
2025-05-25
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1002/sres.3161
Citations
1
Primary Topic
Supply Chain and Inventory Management
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
2.28
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article

Research on Dynamic Role Remodelling of Global Supply Chain From the Perspective of Stackelberg Game

Sui Jianli, Jing Ge
1 citations
Systems Research and Behavioral Science
Supply Chain and Inventory Management
2.28
article

Research on Dynamic Role Remodelling of Global Supply Chain From the Perspective of Stackelberg Game

Sui Jianli, Jing Ge
article en
1 citations

Abstract

ABSTRACT Amid escalating Sino–US trade frictions, enterprises face mounting challenges related to uncertainty and the stability of global supply chains. In response, firms are increasingly pursuing cooperative strategies and structural reorganization to maintain competitiveness. Among these strategies, product patent licensing has emerged as a critical mechanism for redefining roles within the global supply chain. This study investigates a supply chain comprising two firms, where one firm produces and sells two complementary products while licensing one product to the other firm for competitive production and sales. By employing the Stackelberg game model, we analyse how patent licensing influences firms' decision‐making, profitability, product demand, consumer surplus and social welfare, with a particular focus on its implications for role repositioning in the global supply chain. Through mathematical modelling, we derive the optimal decisions of both firms before and after licensing. Our findings reveal that licensing generally leads to higher pricing and increased sales of licensed products but adversely affects the pricing and demand for complementary products. Notably, when the licensing fee is set at a moderate level, it maximizes the licensee's total profit. Furthermore, numerical experiments demonstrate that licensing typically enhances consumer surplus and improves social welfare in most scenarios, although excessively high licensing fees may diminish social welfare. These results underscore the strategic importance of role repositioning within global supply chains, enabling firms to sustain competitive advantages and maximize profits amidst Sino–US trade tensions. Importantly, this study highlights the potential of patent licensing as a tool for fostering collaboration and resilience in uncertain trade environments. The insights gained from this research offer valuable guidance for decision‐makers in formulating effective global supply chain management strategies and future‐oriented policies. This work contributes to the literature by providing a novel framework for understanding the interplay between patent licensing, role repositioning and supply chain dynamics under trade frictions, offering practical benefits for firms navigating complex international markets.

Systems Research and Behavioral ScienceVol. 42(4)
Jilin University of Finance and Economics (CN), Jilin University (CN), Changchun University of Technology (CN)
Openalex Percentile: Top 12%
Supply Chain and Inventory Management
2.28
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