An Antidote to Populist Ill-Rule? Polycentric Deliberation and Excess Mortality in the COVID-19 Pandemic

Abstract It has often proven difficult for scholars of populist governance to untangle the policy results produced by populist governments from the conditions that might lead voters to elect populist leaders. The COVID -19 pandemic – an exogenous event occurring amidst the rise of populist governments to power in many of the world’s democracies – offers a unique window into populist crisis management. Are populists less effective crisis managers when the stakes are high? And if so, what factors might mitigate populist ill-rule? In this paper I present evidence that populist-led governments experienced greater levels of excess mortality in the COVID -19 pandemic for any level of public health intervention across a sample of mid to high-income democracies. Simultaneously, I also find evidence that parliamentary institutions mitigated the populist mortality premium.