Reimagining Legal Subjectivity: The Politics of Disability Rights and Inclusive Law

This article aims to critically examine and reimagine the concept of legal subjectivity through the lens of disability rights and inclusive law. Employing a scientific narrative review approach grounded in descriptive analysis, the article draws on recent interdisciplinary literature published between 2021 and 2024, legal documents, and international frameworks. Academic databases such as HeinOnline, JSTOR, Westlaw, Scopus, and Google Scholar were used to identify sources relevant to legal subjectivity, disability justice, inclusive jurisprudence, and participatory legal models. The selected literature was analyzed thematically to explore the evolution of disability rights, the normative challenges of the traditional legal subject, and emerging models of relational and inclusive legal recognition. The review reveals that the traditional liberal construction of the legal subject—as autonomous, rational, and independent—excludes individuals whose embodied, cognitive, or social experiences fall outside these normative boundaries. Disability disrupts core legal binaries such as capacity versus incapacity and independence versus dependency, exposing the need for a more relational, embodied, and inclusive framework for legal recognition. The analysis highlights how supported decision-making frameworks, universal design in law, and participatory legal reforms have begun to reshape access to justice and civic participation for persons with disabilities. Nonetheless, systemic barriers remain, including exclusionary procedural norms, evidentiary requirements, and institutional resistance, which continue to limit the transformative potential of inclusive law. Reimagining legal subjectivity requires a fundamental shift in how legal systems understand agency, autonomy, and justice. By embracing the principles of participation, accessibility, and recognition, inclusive law offers a pathway toward a post-liberal legal subject grounded in interdependence and dignity. This transformation demands not only doctrinal change but also pedagogical, jurisprudential, and institutional reform to ensure that all individuals are meaningfully recognized as legal actors.